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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Consider the following: During a joint session of a child custody 
mediation one parent says to the other, “The children are afraid of 
spending time with you. Let’s just put it on the table, your disciplin-
ing of the children is nothing short of abuse!” Following a predictable 
response that the discipline situation is being blown out of propor-
tion, the accusing parent describes three episodes of apparently abu-
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sive behavior. What responsibilities does the mediator have once the 
information is divulged? Should the mediator immediately contact 
the state Child Protection Services and report the alleged abuse? 
What happens if the mediator does not make a report? The answers 
to these questions depend on several factors, but should they? 
 Scenarios like the one described above are not far-fetched because 
mediation1 has become a vital component of the litigation process for 
divorce and child custody matters.2 In fact, it is difficult to proceed to 
a hearing on the merits of a child custody case without being re-
quired to attend at least one mediation session.3  With mandatory 
mediation so prevalent in child custody cases, it stands to reason 
that mediators may be the first to hear allegations of child abuse.4 
Surprisingly, however, child abuse issues are rarely discussed in the 
mediation literature.5 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Mediation can be simply defined as a facilitated negotiation process in which an 
impartial third party assists disputing parties in their attempt to resolve a dispute. See, 
e.g., SARA R. COLE ET AL., 1 MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE ch. 1:1-1:2 (2005); 
Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New 
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18 (2003); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Preamble (2005), available at  
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf 
hereinafter 2005 MODEL STANDARDS]; THE SYMPOSIUM ON MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 
FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND 
DIVORCE MEDIATION, Overview and Definitions (2000), available at  
http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf [hereinafter MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS]. 
 2. Ann L. Milne et al., The Evolution of Divorce and Family Mediation: An Overview, 
in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 3, 10-12 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004) (discussing 
court-connected mediation in family matters). 
 3. See, e.g., id.; Mary Kay Kisthardt & Barabara Handschu, Tips on Mediation, 
NAT’L L.J., Dec. 5, 2005, at A15. 
 4. Most mediators in child custody cases routinely screen cases for signs of child 
abuse and exclude those cases from their mediation practice. ALISON TAYLOR, THE 
HANDBOOK OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 200-02 (2002). But see Robert D. Benjamin, 
Mediative Strategies in the Management of Child Sexual Abuse Matters, 29 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 221 (1991). However, not all cases involving abuse can be 
screened out of divorce and custody mediations because the issue may have yet to come to 
the fore. Thus, because mediators may be the first to hear reports of child abuse, they must 
be prepared to address the issue should it surface.  
 5. The topic is virtually untouched in the scholarly literature, other than as a side 
issue to another topic, such as mediation confidentiality or mediation where domestic vio-
lence is present. See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the 
U.S. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 247-48 (2002); Kevin Gibson, 
Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 51-53; Mi-
chael Moffit, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81, 114 
(2003); Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce 
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 200 
(2003). The only scholarly piece discussing the issue in depth is a student comment dis-
cussing lawyer-mediators and mandatory reporting requirements. Heather Rushing Pot-
ter, Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation and the Duty to Report Child Abuse, 29 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 269 (2005). Practitioner guidebooks are the only other place the issue gets 
any serious attention, but even then the topic gets only a couple of pages at most. See, e.g., 
DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 294 (1998); TAYLOR, supra 
note 4, at 200-05. 
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 Currently the states disagree as to whether mediators should or 
should not be mandatory reporters of child abuse. To confuse matters 
further, some states split their mediator ranks into groups of manda-
tory reporters and permissive reporters based on professional train-
ing in fields other than mediation. Because failing to make a report 
when one is required to do so may lead to both criminal and civil li-
ability, mediators must be well versed in their responsibilities with 
regard to reporting suspected child abuse and neglect to state Child 
Protection Services (CPS).  
 This lack of consensus brings a larger and more important ques-
tion into focus: Does having mediators act as mandatory reporters of 
child abuse constitute wise public policy? A reasoned look at the 
various policies behind mandatory reporting and mediation reveals 
that child protection already is enmeshed in mediation’s primary 
goal—improving outcomes for all parties affected by the mediation 
process, including children. Neither a child’s best interests nor soci-
ety’s best interests are served if mediators, through inaction, are 
permitted to allow possible abuse to continue without further inves-
tigation. As a result, mandatory reporting will improve mediation 
outcomes when child abuse issues arise. Additionally, making media-
tors mandatory reporters of abuse furthers strong child protection 
policies by filling a small hole in the reporting network. Thus, this 
Article concludes that all mediators in divorce and child custody 
cases should be mandatory reporters for child abuse.  
 Based on this conclusion, this Article makes several recommenda-
tions. The first is statutory: State legislatures should revise their 
mandatory reporting laws to include mediators among the profes-
sions identified as mandatory reporters of child abuse and neglect. 
This change, however, will have consequences for mediation. In a 
mandatory reporting environment, preserving mediation’s core val-
ues is essential for its continuing vitality as a dispute resolution 
mechanism in family matters. Thus, the remaining recommendations 
constitute practice pointers designed to manage the negative impact 
reporting requirements may have on mediation’s core values of party 
self-determination, mediator neutrality, and confidentiality.  
 Part II of this Article gives a brief overview of mediation in di-
vorce and child custody matters—describing the rise of mediation in 
these cases, discussing the various benefits the process provides for 
families, and detailing how mediation’s core values empower indi-
viduals to resolve complex and highly emotional family disputes. 
Part III is a discussion of the mandatory reporting laws, examining 
what conduct is to be reported and when it is to be reported. Al-
though this section does not analyze each state’s reporting statute, it 
provides the basis for which mediators can examine and better un-
derstand their own state’s reporting law. Part IV identifies which 
274  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:271 
 
mediators are currently mandatory reporters of abuse, focusing at-
tention on whether one’s reporting requirements are a function of ei-
ther a reporter’s professional role or the fact that one is designated 
as a mandatory reporter. Part V focuses on the arguments in favor of 
and against requiring mediators to be mandatory reporters of abuse.  
 Part VI asserts that all family mediators should be mandatory re-
porters of abuse and addresses concerns that mediation will become 
a vehicle for fraudulent claims of abuse, simply putting more strain 
on an already overburdened child protection system. Furthermore, 
this section provides advice for mediators who are mandatory report-
ers to minimize reporting’s negative impact on mediation’s core val-
ues. To conclude, Part VII calls for mediator education to ensure that 
the mediators handle their reporting responsibilities professionally 
while maintaining the integrity of the mediation process. 
II.   MEDIATION IN FAMILY MATTERS 
 Mediation has been an effective method of conflict resolution for 
centuries, but only in the last thirty years has it become a generally 
accepted method of resolving civil cases in the United States.6 During 
this period mediation has become widely used in divorce and child 
custody matters.  
A.   History of Mediation in Family Matters 
 In the 1970s, as divorce became more socially acceptable in the 
United States and states began to replace traditional fault-finding 
divorce with no-fault divorce statutes, a small number of lawyers be-
gan offering “non-adversarial legal services” to divorcing couples.7 
Because these lawyers counseled both spouses to help them settle fi-
nancial, property, and child custody issues, they were heavily criti-
cized within the legal profession and threatened with ethical sanc-
tions by the bar.8 Despite such pressures, these lawyers began devel-
oping the divorce mediation concept and marketing it through books 
and professional mediation associations.9 
 Around the same time, mental health professionals began direct-
ing their services to the emotional and mental health concerns sur-
                                                                                                                     
 6. For detailed discussions of the history of mediation and its growth in the United 
States, see generally JEROME T. BARRETT WITH JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT (2004); COLE, ET AL, supra note 1, at ch. 5. 
 7. Milne et al., supra note 2, at 4-5. 
 8. See, e.g., id.; Or. State Bar Ethics Op. 488 (1983); Linda J. Silberman, Professional 
Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107 (1982). 
 9. Milne et al., supra note 2, at 5. See generally O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED 
MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978). 
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rounding divorce.10 Divorce counseling and the study of divorcing 
couples in the mental health realm soon lead to the understanding 
that divorce is a multidimensional process involving both legal and 
psychological matters.11 As a result, some of these mental health pro-
fessionals joined the professional mediation associations and also be-
gan offering mediation services to their divorcing clients.12   
 Despite the bar’s early hostility to mediation, judges welcomed the 
resulting reduction of cases from their dockets and encouraged its 
use.13 Before long, court administrators were suggesting more wide-
spread use of mediation.14 In 1980, California passed the first statute 
requiring all parents with custody or visitation disputes to partici-
pate in mediation either prior to or concurrent with court proceed-
ings.15 Such statutes quickly spread across the country,16 and today a 
divorce or child custody matter not going to mediation is the excep-
tion to the rule.17 
B.   Benefits of Mediation in Family Matters 
 Empirical research on mediation in divorce and child custody mat-
ters supports the conclusion that mediation offers various benefits 
when compared to the traditional adversarial system: more settle-
                                                                                                                     
 10. Milne et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. Mental health providers were also subject to criticism from bar associations 
and were subjected to unauthorized practice of law claims. Linda Silberman, Ethical Con-
straints: A Legal Perspective, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 359, 371, 374 
(Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988).  
 13. Milne et al., supra note 2, at 6; Isolina Ricci, Court-Based Mandatory Mediation: 
Special Considerations, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 397, 398 (Jay Folberg et al. 
eds., 2004); Andrew Schepard, The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce 
Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 
516, 526 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004). 
 14. Milne et al., supra note 2, at 6. 
 15. Ricci, supra note 13, at 399 (giving a brief historical background of court-
connected family mediation programs).  
 16. Mandatory mediation’s quick growth brought forth a flood of criticism and debate 
about the fairness of mediation for women, especially for victims of domestic violence. See, 
e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 
BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) (arguing that mediation only empowers the already more power-
ful party in the relationship); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for 
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (arguing that mandatory mediation is harmful to those 
who are already subordinated by the legal system); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of 
Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (1991) (arguing that mediation leads to better outcomes 
and less emotional harm than does traditional litigation). The issue of mediation’s impact 
on divorcing women is still a hot topic today. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, 
Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of Crafting Effective 
Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53 (2005); Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 180-88. However, it is ac-
cepted that one-size-fits-all solutions regarding divorce and mediation are inadequate, es-
pecially for couples with a history of domestic violence. Id. at 159; Alexandria Zylstra, Me-
diation and Domestic Violence: A Practical Screening Method for Mediators and Mediation 
Program Administrators, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 253. 
 17. Kisthardt & Handschu, supra note 3; Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 170, 193. 
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ments,18 time savings,19 cost efficiency for the litigants,20 higher com-
pliance with agreements,21 higher participant satisfaction,22 and less 
subsequent litigation or relitigation of issues.23 But the greatest 
benefit of using mediation in divorce and child custody cases is its 
ability to increase the quality of the parties’ communication to ad-
dress emotionally charged issues.24  
 In custody cases, the heightened degree of communication is par-
ticularly important because parents are likely to have future interac-
tions with each other related to the children. Recent empirical re-
search indicates that divorcing spouses who go through child custody 
mediation have improved relationships with each other compared to 
divorcing spouses who did not go through mediation, even twelve 
years after the mediated settlement.25 The research also indicates 
that nonresident parents have “remarkably” improved relationships 
with their children.26 Ultimately, divorce and child custody mediation 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery et al., Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 
FAM. CT. REV. 22, 26 (2005) (reporting that in divorce and custody cases 11% of mediated 
cases “appeared in front of a judge” compared to 72% of cases involved in traditional adver-
sarial settlement negotiations); see also Connie J.A. Beck et al., Research on the Impact of 
Family Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 447, 452 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 
2004). 
 19. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 18, at 451 (concluding that time savings for liti-
gants is a “compelling” reason for advocating mediation over litigation in divorce actions).    
 20. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Is Mediation Less Expensive?: Comparison of Mediated 
and Adversarial Divorce Costs, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 23 (1990) (finding that mediating di-
vorce couples incurred 50% of the costs of litigating divorce couples); Jessica A. Pearson, 
Family Mediation in A REPORT ON CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGS—IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COURTS AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 53 (S. Keilitz ed., 1994) (finding a substantial fi-
nancial benefit when mediation resulted in an agreement and finding no financial benefit 
when mediation was unsuccessful in reaching a settlement). But see Beck et al., supra note 
18, at 449 (describing studies showing mixed results on the question of whether mediation 
participants save money as a result of mediation). 
 21. See Beck et al., supra note 18, at 453 (discussing studies that show “modest” sup-
port for the proposition that mediated agreements are complied with more often than nego-
tiated settlements); Emery et al., supra note 18, at 28; Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation 
Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 3, 29 (2004) 
(summarizing several empirical studies of mediation participants). 
 22. See, e.g., Emery et al., supra note 18, at 28 (reporting higher participant satisfac-
tion with mediation than traditional adversarial settlement negotiations six weeks, a year 
and a half, and twelve years after settlement) (citations omitted). 
 23. Beck et al., supra note 18, at 452. 
 24. See Emery et al., supra note 18, at 30-32 (reporting findings from a twelve-year 
study comparing divorced couples who went through mediation to divorced couples that 
reached a settlement through traditional adversarial negotiation); see also Mary Kay 
Kisthardt, The Use of Mediation and Arbitration for Resolving Family Conflicts: What 
Lawyers Think About Them, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 353 (1997) (indicating that 
attorneys believe that mediation improves the parties’ dealing in child custody issues). 
 25. Emery et al., supra note 18, at 31. Specifically, Emery and his colleagues found 
that “when parents mediated rather than continuing with the legal action over their chil-
dren, twelve years later the residential parent reported that the nonresidential parent was 
. . . significantly more likely to discuss problems with the residential parent.” Id. 
 26. Id. at 22. Emery and his colleagues reported:  
2007]               MEDIATORS AS MANDATORY REPORTERS 277 
 
provides a forum for renegotiating relationships as well as negotiat-
ing settlement agreements.27  
C.   Mediation’s Core Values 
 The ability to settle complex and highly emotional disputes by 
recognizing both the emotional and legal dimensions of family mat-
ters makes mediation a unique and valuable dispute resolution proc-
ess.28 Mediation addresses these issues through three interdependent 
core values: party self-determination, mediator neutrality, and confi-
dentiality of mediation communications.29 These three values are in-
tricately tied to mediation’s purposes as a conflict-resolution device: 
settling disputes; defining, clarifying, and narrowing the issues in 
dispute; understanding differing perspectives; identifying interests; 
and empowering individuals to manage their conflicts.30 A basic 
theme running through these purposes is to provide a personalized 
approach to resolving disputes free of the constraints of the adversar-
ial legal process.31 In divorce and child custody disputes this trans-
lates into developing workable options that best meet the needs of 
the participants, improving their decision making and producing bet-
ter outcomes than they may otherwise achieve.32 Underlying media-
                                                                                                                     
Thirty percent of nonresidential parents who mediated saw their children once 
a week or more twelve years after the initial dispute in comparison to only 9% 
of parents in the [traditional adversarial negotiation settlement] group. At the 
opposite extreme, 39% of nonresidential parents in the [traditional adversarial 
negotiation settlement] group had seen their children only once or not at all in 
the last year compared to 15% in the mediation group. . . . 
  . . . In the mediation group, 54% of nonresidential parents spoke to their 
children on the telephone once a week or more often in contrast to 13% in the 
[traditional adversarial negotiation settlement] group. Once again at the oppo-
site extreme, 54% of nonresidential parents in the [traditional adversarial ne-
gotiation settlement] group had not spoken with their children on the tele-
phone in the last year, or had done so only once, in comparison to 12% in the 
mediation group.  
Id. at 30-31.  
 27. ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD 
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION 175 (1994). 
 28. Kelly, supra note 21, at 28; Milne et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 29. Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting “Good Faith” Reports Under the 
Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. 
DISP. RES. 67, 86; John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-
Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 69, 70 n.1 
(2002); see also 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, §§ I, II, V; MODEL FAMILY 
STANDARDS, supra note 1, §§ I, IV, VII. 
 30. See, e.g., 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble; MODEL FAMILY 
STANDARDS, supra note 1, Overview and Definitions; ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH 
P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994) (arguing that the primary purposes of me-
diation are empowerment of individuals and recognition of the concerns of others involved 
in the conflict). 
 31. Milne et al., supra note 2, at 8. 
 32. See id.; CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL, 270-71 (2005) (describing the ability to create outcomes that can 
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tion’s core values and purposes is the need for the sharing of infor-
mation in order to enable better decision making.  
1.   Party Self-Determination 
 Party self-determination is often described as the fundamental 
principle that differentiates mediation from other third-party dispute 
resolution processes.33 Mediation ethics codes describe self-
determination in terms of voluntary decision making,34 but the es-
sence of self-determination is party empowerment.35 As one author 
has noted, self-determination promises disputants “the opportunity 
to participate actively and directly in the process of resolving their 
dispute, control the substantive norms guiding their discussion and 
decision-making, create the options for settlement, and control the 
final outcome of the dispute resolution process.”36  In other words, the 
parties are at the center of the mediation process, acting as its prin-
cipal actors and creators.37 
 However, there are several restraints to self-determination in me-
diation. In particular, mediators exert a high degree of influence on 
deciding which procedures will be used to address the mediation’s 
substantive issues.38 Mediators also often make decisions for the par-
ties relating to (a) how proposed settlements are developed and pre-
sented and (b) the conditions under which the mediator should 
evaluate or arrange for an evaluation of the parties’ respective posi-
tions.39 By making these decisions, mediators encroach on the par-
ties’ self-determination as it relates to procedural decision making.40  
 Mediators also assert their influence when it comes to substantive 
decision making in mediation.41 In the attempt to resolve a dispute, 
mediators may urge parties to settle or accept a particular settle-
                                                                                                                     
maximize benefits for all sides when compared to litigation alternatives); CHRISTOPHER 
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 297-
98 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing how mediators assist parties assess how well their interests 
are satisfied by various settlement options and determining the costs and benefits of their 
acceptance or rejection).  
 33. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2001); MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § I. 
 34. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § I; MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 
1, § I. 
 35. Welsh, supra note 33, at 18; see also Milne et al., supra note 2, at 8 (describing 
how an agreement reached between the participants is more likely to be supported than an 
imposed order). 
 36. Welsh, supra note 33, at 17-18. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Riskin, supra note 1, at 35, 44.  
 39. Id. at 35. For a long list of procedural issues in mediation, see id. at 35-36. 
 40. Id. at 28.  
 41. Substantive decisions in mediation include determining what gave rise to the dis-
pute and trying to make decisions to resolve the dispute. Id. at 34. 
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ment proposal or range, propose position-based compromises, predict 
court outcomes, and assess the strengths and weaknesses of each 
side’s legal case.42 These practices have been roundly criticized for 
impairing the parties’ self-determination.43 Many in the mediation 
field, however, argue that mediators should be able to use their ex-
pertise to assist mediating parties to evaluate their legal claims,44 
maintaining that this enhances the parties’ self-determination by 
contributing to more informed decision making.45 Further, they rec-
ognize that most mediated disputes call for some combination of me-
diation styles, including the evaluation of legal claims.46  
 This discussion reflects, in part, a disagreement over the signifi-
cance that social norms, such as the law, play in mediation partici-
pants’ negotiations and mediators’ uses of those norms.47 Although in 
mediation practice the concept of self-determination may not meet 
the vision of party empowerment reflected in mediation ethics rules, 
mediation remains a process that can allow parties to control their fate 
and reach a voluntary agreement tailored to their specific needs.48 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Tech-
niques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996); see also Bobbi 
McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 MO. L 
REV. 473, 523 (2002) (reporting that attorneys found mediators evaluate legal claims and 
push parties toward settlement); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Me-
diation: What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 805-09 (2001) (discussing 
the preference for the evaluation of legal claims in court-connected mediation). 
 43. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of 
Riskin’s Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why 
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997). 
 44. See, e.g., John Lande, Toward a More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 321, 330; Jeffery W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Ecclectic: Liberating 
ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 247, 269. 
 45. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Prin-
ciple for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 777 (1999) (arguing 
that self-determination is undermined without informed consent); Riskin, supra note 1, at 
19-20; see also Welsh, supra note 42, at 805-09 (discussing various reasons for mediators to 
evaluate legal claims).  
 46. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 32, at 56; Margaret L. Shaw, Style Schmyle: What’s 
Evaluation Got to Do with It?, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 17, 19-20 (2005); Stempel, supra note 
44, at 252-53.  
 47. Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple 
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 707-09 (1997). Waldman discusses three different 
models for incorporating norms into the mediation process. In the norm-generating model, 
party discussions do not include social norms and the only relevant norms are those the 
parties create for themselves in the mediation. Id. at 718. In the norm-educating model, 
mediators inform disputant negotiators of the relevant legal and social norms that impact 
their dispute in an attempt to enhance party autonomy by allowing parties to make the 
most informed settlement decisions possible. Id. at 731-32. In the norm-advocating model, 
the mediator acts as the guardian or enforcer of social norms to make sure the parties fol-
low them. Id. at 745. 
 48. See Barbara Filner & Michael Jenkins, Performance-Based Evaluation of Media-
tors: The San Diego Mediation Center’s Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 650 (1996); Peter 
N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Tension Be-
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2.   Mediator Neutrality 
 The idea of mediator neutrality is deeply embedded in the ethos of 
mediation and has been called the “sine qua non of mediation.”49 The 
parties must perceive the mediator and the mediation process to be 
fair and even-handed in order to develop trust in the mediator to cre-
ate an effective working relationship.50  
 Mediator neutrality embraces two ideas of how the mediator 
should relate to the parties and their dispute in mediation.51 The 
more straightforward aspect of mediator neutrality involves disclos-
ing and resolving actual and potential conflicts of interest with the 
parties and with the subject matter of their dispute.52 Like a judge 
adjudicating a case, a mediator must have minimal prior relation-
ships with the parties and must have no other conflicts of interest, 
because these factors may be perceived to indicate favoritism, even 
when none exists.53 
 The more difficult concept of mediator neutrality is impartiality.54 
Most mediation authorities describe impartiality as being free from 
favoritism, bias, or prejudice.55 In other words, the mediator should 
not favor one party over another, one party’s interests over another’s, 
or a specific solution one party advocates.56 This aspect of impartial-
ity helps build the parties’ trust in the mediator, which makes them 
                                                                                                                     
tween the Aspirations of a Private Facilitated Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial 
Justice, 19 OH. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 556 (2004). But see James R. Coben, Gollum, 
Meet Sméagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-
Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFL. RESOL. 65, 77 (2004) (worrying that 
unsophisticated mediation consumers are taken advantage of by repeat mediation players). 
 49. Filner & Jenkins, supra note 48, at 649; see also Riskin, supra note 42, at 47.  
 50. MOORE, supra note 32, at 54; see also Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, 
Surveying the State of the Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Lousi-
ana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 923 (1997) (reporting that the mediator’s perceived neutral role 
enhances participant perceptions of the legitimacy of the mediation process); Ellen E. Dea-
son, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial 
Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 82 (2001). 
 51. Orna Cohen et al., The Limits of the Mediator’s Neutrality, 16 MEDIATION Q. 341, 
341-42 (1999); Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for 
Customizing Neutrality Through Contigent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 256 (2003).  
 52. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § III; Cohen et al., supra note 51, at 341-42. 
 53. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § III; MOORE, supra note 32, at 53. Media-
tion parties do have the ability to waive these kinds of conflicts of interest if they so desire 
and the mediator agrees to do so as well. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § III(C). 
Additionally, the way mediator fees are paid should not affect the mediator’s relationship 
to the parties and their dispute. Id.  § VIII; MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § IV. 
 54. Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in 
Mediation, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 35, 43 (1991). Mediation practitioners often use the terms 
neutrality and impartiality interchangeably. Id. at 42.  
 55. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § II; MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra 
note 1, § IV. Furthermore, the 2005 Model Standards require mediators to refrain from 
conduct that merely gives the appearance of partiality. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra 
note 1, § II. 
 56. MOORE, supra note 32, at 53. 
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more likely to share information with the mediator.57 In addition, 
freedom from bias adds value to the negotiation by allowing the me-
diator to recognize various options and potential solutions that the 
parties cannot see because of their cognitive and psychological bi-
ases.58 Moreover, it keeps the mediator from undermining the par-
ties’ ability to craft their own solution to the problem, thereby sup-
porting the parties’ self-determination.59 
 Practically speaking, however, once a mediator makes it past the 
mechanical conflicts check and the mediation begins, it is often diffi-
cult for the mediator to be completely impartial due to the relational 
nature of the mediator’s task. To assist both parties in understand-
ing and expressing their interests and determining whether settle-
ment offers embody those interests, mediators need to develop trust-
ing relationships with the parties.60 During this process, the media-
tor may engage in what are considered legitimate mediator moves61 
that may favor one side over the other at any given moment as the 
mediator spends time focusing on each party’s interests and aspira-
tions.62 The challenge is to cultivate the relationships necessary for a 
successful mediation without compromising the mediator’s profes-
sional distance from the parties.63 This limited bias phenomenon is 
known as equidistance because the mediator will do this with both 
parties, even though one party may need more mediator attention 
and assistance than the other.64  
 Some argue that impartiality and equidistance are inherently in-
consistent, which leads to paradoxical dilemmas for mediators who 
try to equate the two.65 Others argue that they are consistent because 
the limited bias is used to create symmetry between the parties by 
engaging in the same behaviors with each and impartiality is gauged 
by the process as a whole, not through moment-by-moment calcula-
                                                                                                                     
 57. Peppet, supra note 51, at 255. 
 58. Id.; Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”: Mediation’s 
“Value Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9-14 (1996). 
 59. Peppet, supra note 51, at 256. 
 60. See, e.g., Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict Together: The 
Understanding-Based Model of Mediation, 4 J. AM. ARB. 225, 234, 236-37 (2005). 
 61. Such moves include breaking into caucus, playing the role of devil’s advocate, or 
engaging in negotiation coaching.  
 62. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 54, at 43; Cohen et al., supra note 51, at 343; Peppet, 
supra note 51, at 256; see also MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § VI (requiring 
mediators to structure the process “so that the participants make decisions based on suffi-
cient information and knowledge”). 
 63. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 54, at 45; see also Friedman & Himmelstein, supra note 
60, at 243. This balancing act is demanding and highly dependent on the chemistry be-
tween the parties, their representatives, and the mediator. 
 64. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 54, at 44-45; see also Friedman & Himmelstein, supra 
note 60, at 234 (calling this phenomenon “positive neutrality”). 
 65. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 54, at 45. 
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tions.66 Thus, true neutrality requires mediators to be successful in 
somewhat contradictory tasks—to actively participate in the process yet 
remain detached from the parties, their positions, and the outcome.67  
3.   Confidentiality 
 With the promulgation of numerous state and federal laws regard-
ing mediation confidentiality, including the recent Uniform Media-
tion Act,68 there is a consensus that some degree of confidentiality 
protection for mediation communications is critical to the success of 
mediation.69 This lack of controversy is due in part to the fact that 
the same presumption underlies the rules of evidence making set-
tlement negotiations generally inadmissible in court proceedings.70 
Although encompassed by settlement-related evidentiary rules, me-
diation confidentiality benefits from stronger protections than typical 
bilateral settlement negotiations.71  
 One reason for this heightened degree of confidentiality protection 
is that mediation is a more formalized method of negotiation, de-
signed to nurture candor and effective communications between ad-
verse parties and the mediator.72 Typically the premediation level of 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 44. 
 67. See Beck et al., supra note 18, at 471-73; Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 54, at 48-49; 
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 93 (1996) (describing the mediator as either a “disinterested referee” or 
an “empowerment specialist”). 
 68. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
MEDIATION ACT (2001), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma [hereinafter 
UMA]. Currently eight states (Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, 
and Washington) and the District of Columbia have adopted the UMA. Chip Stewart, ADR 
News, DISP. RES. MAG., Summer 2006, at 29, 29.  
 69. See Deason, supra note 5, at 243-44 (discussing the lack of controversy related to 
the need for confidentiality in mediation); Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality’s Constitu-
tionality: The Incursion on Judicial Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected 
Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 32-33 (2003) (discussing the popular belief that con-
fidentiality is vital to mediation). Contra Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation 
Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1986). 
 70. See FED. R. EVID. 408 (rendering settlement offers, settlements, and statements 
arising from settlement negotiations inadmissible in court to prove the validity or invalid-
ity of a claim). 
 71. Compare id. (allowing the introduction of settlement offers and settlements into 
evidence for purposes other than proving the validity or invalidity of a claim), with UMA, 
supra note 68, §§ 4, 7 (creating a privilege against disclosure of mediation communications, 
excluding their subjection to discovery, and prohibiting their disclosure to tribunals in re-
ports), and Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004) (affirming the denial of motion 
to compel production of materials produced in connection to mediation between co-
defendants in prior litigation because the materials were prepared specifically for use in 
that mediation). See also Weston, supra note 69, at 48-49 (explaining that the limits asso-
ciated with settlement-related confidentiality protection prompted statutory confidentiality 
protection for mediation communications). 
 72. See, e.g., In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Poly Software Int’l., Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995)); In re Sargeant 
Farms, Inc., 224 B.R. 842, 848 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (“[n]othing should prevent full dis-
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communication between litigating parties is low because their rela-
tionship has devolved into one of animosity and distrust.73 But for 
cases to settle in mediation, the parties must be willing to have frank 
discussions about their positions, intentions, and desires with the 
mediator and, either directly or indirectly through the mediator, with 
the opposing party.74 While confidentiality is not a surrogate for trust 
in the other party, it does create a trust in the mediation process that 
such statements will not resurface as admissions against interest in 
later court proceedings.75  Thus, confidentiality creates an environ-
ment in which disputing parties and their lawyers can feel relatively 
safe making statements that may otherwise belie their efforts out-
side of mediation.76  
 Besides encouraging candor in communications, confidentiality 
also helps ensure that the perception of mediator neutrality extends 
beyond the mediation session. Most, if not all, mediation confidential-
ity statutes and rules explicitly bar mediators from being called as 
witnesses in court proceedings.77 If mediators could be called as wit-
nesses in either the underlying case or in subsequent litigation, their 
testimony, even if purely factual, could be perceived to favor one 
party over another, bringing the integrity of the entire mediation 
process into question.78 
                                                                                                                     
cussion and absolute candor with the mediator”); UMA, supra note 68, Prefatory Note 1; 
see also Deason, supra note 50, at 80. 
 73. Deason, supra note 50, at 80-81. 
 74. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d at 993 (quoting Poly Software Int’l., 880 
F. Supp. at 1494); Sargeant Farms, 224 B.R. at 848; see also Deason, supra note 5, at 245. 
 75. Deason, supra note 50, at 80-81.  
 76. See, e.g., In re Lake Utopia Paper Ltd., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979). As that 
court stated, 
If [mediation] participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of every-
thing that transpires during these sessions then counsel of necessity will feel 
constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal 
manner more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversar-
ies attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute. 
Id. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 
(6th Cir. 2003); UMA, supra note 68, Prefatory Note 1; Deason, supra note 5, at 247. 
 77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238(c) (2004 & Supp. 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 
435.014 (1994); UMA, supra note 68, § IV(b)(2). The inability to call mediators as witnesses 
in subsequent court proceedings also serves to separate mediation functions from the judi-
cial function of the courts. Deason, supra note 50, at 83.  
 78. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 639 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting NLRB v. Jo-
seph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1980)).  
 This point is illustrated well in congressional testimony regarding the Railroad Labor 
Board’s duties in the 1920s and 30s. After its creation by the 1920 Transportation Act, 
railroads and their unions lost confidence in the Railroad Labor Board’s ability to settle 
their labor disputes because the Board had both mediatory and adjudicatory functions. See 
Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1971). To correct 
this problem, Congress passed the Railway Labor Act in 1926. In support of the act, Mr. 
Donald R. Richberg, an attorney for the railroad unions, testified before Congress: 
The board of mediation, to preserve its ability to mediate year after year be-
tween the parties, must not be given any duties to make public reports con-
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 Although the confidentiality protections in mediation are among 
the most powerful in litigation, in some situations public policy fa-
vors disclosing statements made in mediation to satisfy values 
deemed more important than confidentiality. For example, in some 
states, judges have statutory authority to balance these values with 
mediation confidentiality on a case-by-case basis to avoid manifest 
injustice or to enforce court orders.79 Some state legislatures have de-
cided that certain mediation communications should not be confiden-
tial, such as threats of violence or harm,80 disclosures of ongoing 
criminal activity,81 or communications evidencing professional mis-
conduct or malpractice by mediators or lawyers.82 Furthermore, some 
confidentiality statutes give deference to mandatory reporting stat-
utes by excluding from confidentiality protection communications 
that would lead to a report of suspected child abuse.83 Despite these 
contours, mediation confidentiality is among the most powerful con-
fidentiality protections available in litigation.  
III.   MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS 
 In a number of arenas, strong public policies supporting family 
privacy and integrity84 are balanced against a countervailing societal 
                                                                                                                     
demning one party or the other, even though the board may think one party is 
wrong. . . . That is the reason why the Labor Board Machinery never would 
work, because a board was constituted to sit and deliver opinions which must 
be opinions for or against one party, and as soon as that board began delivering 
opinions publicly against a party, that party was sure the board was unfair to 
it. . . . The board, in other words, was created in a manner to destroy any confi-
dence in itself. 
Id. at 580 n.13.  
 79. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (Supp. 2006); Wis. Stat. § 904.085(4)(e) 
(2000); see also Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1133-34 (N.D. Cal. 
1999) (requiring mediator testimony under California law to determine whether one party 
to a mediated settlement agreement suffered from either a lack of mental capacity or du-
ress). But see Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270 (Cal. 2004) (rejecting a “good cause” 
exception to California’s mediation privilege because such an exception was not expressly 
provided for by the privilege statute). 
 80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238(D) (2004 & Supp. 2005); UMA, supra note 68, 
§ 6(a)(3). 
 81. See, e.g., CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1119 (1995 & Supp. 2005); UMA, supra note 68, § 
6(a)(4). 
 82. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238(B)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2005); UMA, supra note 
68, § 6(a)(5). 
 83. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-307(b) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§36.220(5), 
36.222(6) (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.073(f) (2002); UMA, supra note 68, § 
7(b)(3). The Reporter for the UMA specifically contemplated mediators acting as manda-
tory reporters. “An exception [to mediation confidentiality exists] for child abuse and ne-
glect is common in domestic mediation confidentiality statutes, and the [UMA] reaffirms 
these important policy choices States have made to protect their citizens.” Id. § 6, Re-
porter’s Notes 8, §§ 6(a)(7) and 7. 
 84. As the Supreme Court stated, 
 The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The 
rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential, basic 
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interest in child welfare and protection.85 One of those areas is paren-
tal authority over their children.86 When parental authority is mis-
used to an extent where children are endangered because of abuse or 
neglect, public policy favors state-sponsored child protection over 
family unity.87 One important means for the state to gather informa-
tion to determine whether parents are abusing or neglecting their 
children is mandatory reporting: requiring certain individuals to re-
port reasonable suspicions of abuse to state authorities.88    
 Mandatory reporting laws are the product of the medical commu-
nity’s recognition of child abuse as a social problem in the early 
1960s.89 In response to this “discovery” and the urging of a group of 
influential physician organizations, state legislatures across the 
                                                                                                                     
civil rights of man, and [r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights. It is 
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obli-
gations the state can neither supply nor hinder. The integrity of the family unit 
has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth 
Amendment. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quotations and citations omitted).  
 85. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (holding that the state has “a 
parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child”). See also 
Robert F. Kelly, Family Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protection 
Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation, Judicial 
Practice and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L.Q. 359, 363-64 (2000) (discussing the ebb and 
flow between policies supporting family integrity and state intervention in the parent-
child relationship). 
 86. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (stating that the government has a 
“traditional and ‘transcendent interest’ ” in protecting children within its jurisdiction from 
child abuse); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745. 
 87. See, e.g., Ex parte G.C., Jr., 924 So. 2d 651 (Ala. 2005) (terminating father’s paren-
tal rights after finding that he had abandoned his parental responsibilities); In re Chris-
tina M., 887 A.2d 941 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (terminating parental rights when parents 
failed to meet reasonable expectations of appropriate parental behavior after taking ad-
vantage of state rehabilitative services); In re J.G., 705 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) 
(terminating mother’s parental rights after finding that mother’s violent proclivities and 
alcoholism would result in daughter being placed in harm’s way if reunited with mother).  
 88. Mandatory reporting laws do not violate constitutional rights to family integrity. 
Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 691 (6th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 520-21 
(7th Cir. 2003); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The right to family integrity 
clearly does not include a constitutional right to be free from child abuse investigations.”). 
 89. Despite some efforts in the late 1800s, child abuse came to the fore of public atten-
tion in 1962 with the publication of an article entitled The Battered-Child Syndrome. C. 
Henry Kampe et al., The Battered–Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962). While several ar-
ticles had previously been written either discussing or alluding to child abuse, it is clear 
that until this article was published, child abuse was considered a minor aberration of par-
enting that was rarely seen and that was likely to be found in children of disadvantaged 
families. See Marilyn Heins, The “Battered Child” Revisited, 251 JAMA 3295, 3296 (1984) 
(identifying seven precursor articles discussing child abuse); Gertrude J. Williams, Cruelty 
and Kindness to Children: Documentary of a Century, 1874-1974, in TRAUMATIC ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN AT HOME 63, 76-77 (Gertrude J. Williams & John Money eds., 
abr. ed. 1982) (documenting the “discovery” of child abuse by the medical world). 
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country quickly passed mandatory reporting laws.90 Today, manda-
tory reporting laws are widely accepted as an integral component in 
the fight against child abuse.91 
 To be responsible reporters of abuse, mandatory reporters must be 
familiar with the elements of their state reporting statute. The two 
critical elements for accurate reporting are the definition of abuse 
and the reporting standard.  
A.   The Definition of Abuse 
 Although definitions of child abuse vary considerably from state to 
state,92 most state reporting statutes describe four different types of 
abuse: physical abuse, neglect, emotional/mental injury, and sexual 
molestation/abuse.93 Physical abuse is generally defined as nonacci-
dental physical injury;94 some states limit the category to “serious” 
injuries,95 and others give a specific list of items that constitute 
physical injury.96 Definitions of “neglect” rely on descriptions of cir-
cumstances and situations where adults fail to meet a basic standard 
                                                                                                                     
 90. By 1967, five years after the publication of The Battered-Child Syndrome, every 
state in the country but one had adopted a child abuse reporting statute. Heins, supra note 
89, at 3295; Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legisla-
tion, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1967). According to one commentator, very few legislative 
concepts have met with such universal acceptance as mandatory reporting laws. Brian G. 
Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical 
Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 
649-50 (1978). 
 91. See, e.g., Seth C. Kalichman & Mary E. Craig, Professional Psychologists’ Deci-
sions to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Clinician and Situation Influences, 22 PROF. 
PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 84, 88 (1991) (reporting that 94% of survey respondents believed 
that mandatory reporting laws are necessary); Seth C. Kalichman et al., Factors Influenc-
ing the Reporting of Father-Child Sexual Abuse: Study of Licensed Practicing Psychologists, 
20 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 84, 87 (1989) (reporting that 85% of survey respondents 
believed that mandatory reporting laws are necessary). See also Salina M. Renninger et 
al., Psychologists’ Knowledge, Opinions, and Decision-Making Processes Regarding Child 
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Laws, 33 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 19, 22 (2002) (report-
ing respondents being fairly satisfied with mandatory reporting laws). 
 92. An in-depth analysis of the various definitions of child abuse across the states is 
beyond the scope of this Article. For more information see generally NAT’L CTR. ON CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT: STATE REPORTING LAWS (1979); SETH C. KALICHMAN, MANDATED REPORTING OF 
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY 20-26 (2d ed. 1999); Fraser, supra 
note 90, at 651-56. For problems with definitions of abuse see Margaret H. Meriwether, 
Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20 FAM. L.Q. 141, 153-61 (1986). 
 93. See generally KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 20-26; Fraser, supra note 90, at 651. 
 94. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.68(2)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 
7102(B)(2)(a) (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005(1)(a)(A) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-
4a-401 (2004). 
 95. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9(a), -(b) (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.1-02(3) (1999). 
 96. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-102 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(g)(1)-(10) 
(2003). 
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of child care.97 “Emotional or mental injury,” when defined at all,98 is 
usually described as an impairment of a child’s ability to function in 
his or her normal range of performance or behavior.99 Likewise, “sex-
ual abuse” often is not defined,100 but several states simply reference 
criminal acts such as rape and sexual assault.101 
B.   The Reporting Standard 
 One of the most confusing facets of mandatory reporting for all 
reporters is the reporting standard itself. Mandatory reporters are 
required to report when they have a “reason to believe”102 or when 
they have a “reasonable cause to suspect or believe”103 child abuse 
has occurred or is occurring. In addition, a small number of states 
look to the potential of abuse, requiring a report of observed condi-
tions or circumstances that “would reasonably result” in abuse.104  
 The impact of the two primary standards appears to be negligible 
when it comes to practitioners’ reporting practices, but the difference 
arises when determining civil or criminal liability for failing to re-
port.105 Under the “reasonable cause to believe” standard the reporter 
need only have a subjective belief regarding abuse to trigger the re-
porting requirement.106 Thus, if the reporter does not believe a report 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(s) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A) 
(West 2005); WIS. STAT. § 48.981(1)(d) (2005). Kansas lists “failure to use resources avail-
able to treat a diagnosed medical condition if such treatment will make a child substan-
tially more comfortable, reduce pain and suffering, or correct or substantially diminish a 
crippling condition from worsening.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(s)(3) (2006). In its defini-
tion of “neglected child,” Ohio includes parents or guardians not providing care for their 
child’s mental condition. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A)(4) (West 2005). 
 98. Some states, while using the terms “emotional abuse” or “mental injury,” do not 
define the terms. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(m) (2002 & Supp. 2004); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 210.110(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-1 (2004).  
 99. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.68(2)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
490(5) (Supp. 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-2(7) (1999). 
 100. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 210.110(1) (2004 & Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
710(2)(a)(v) (Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9(c) (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-
C:3(II)(a) (2001). 
 101. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-701(x)(2)(i) (Supp. 2006) (including “sexual 
offense in any degree”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.622(w), -(x) (2005) (referring to the penal 
code); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(2)(b) (Supp. 2005) (referring to illegal sexual offenses as 
defined by law). 
 102. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3620 (2004 and Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
5 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2004); MD. CODE. ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 5-705, -706 (2004 & 
Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. ST. § 28-711 (Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Supp. 2004). 
 103. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2004 & Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. §17a-101a 
(1998 & Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4012 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-
201 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-6-8 (1999 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1509 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (2005); WIS. STAT. § 48.981 (2005). 
 104. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623(1) (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.02 
(Vernon 2005). 
 105. Meriwether, supra note 92, at 146; KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 27. 
 106. When interpreting the phrase “reasonable cause to believe” in other criminal law 
contexts, courts conclude that it is a subjective standard. See United States v. Truong, 425 
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was required, there is no criminal liability for failing to make a re-
port. In upholding the conviction of a mandatory reporter for failing 
to report under this standard, the Texas Court of Appeals found that 
the defendant had “ ‘sufficient reason’ to believe” abuse was occurring 
when she told the child’s caretakers that she had reported the child’s 
bruises to CPS when, in fact, she had not.107  
 Unlike the “reason to suspect standard,” the “reasonable cause to 
suspect” standard is an objective one: Would a reasonable person in 
similar circumstances believe abuse has occurred or is occurring?108 
In other words, the reasonable cause standard is a totality of the cir-
cumstances test.109 Reporters have violated this standard when fail-
ing to report abuse after observing a child’s physical injuries,110 hear-
ing first person accounts of abuse,111 or having witnesses provide ac-
counts of another’s abusive conduct.112 
 Because of the wide range of information that may prompt the 
need for a report, the “reasonable cause” standard has been criticized 
for being “subjective and undefined”113 and for providing little guid-
ance to practitioners as to when a report should be made.114 These 
criticisms have constituted several constitutional challenges against 
the reporting standard; however, each state appellate court examin-
ing the standard’s constitutionality has upheld the standard, specifi-
cally finding that it is readily understandable and gives fair notice of 
the criminalized conduct.115 One court explained the standard as one 
                                                                                                                     
F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding “reasonable cause to believe” to be a subjective 
determination in a drug statute, 21 U.S.C. § 843(6)). Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 
395 n.12 (1979) (discussing the “reason to believe” standard in a statute criminalizing cer-
tain abortion procedures). See also Fraser, supra note 90, at 659; Meriwether, supra note 
92, at 146. 
 107. White v. State, 50 S.W.3d 31, 47-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).   
 108. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 90, at 659; Meriwether, supra note 92, at 146; 
Marjorie R. Freiman, Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State 
Child Abuse Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 258-59 (1982). 
 109. State v. Hurd, 400 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (cited favorably in State v. 
Denis L.R., 699 N.W.2d 154, 164-65 (Wis. 2005)); see People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 
412-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Brown, 140 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Mo. 2004).  
 110. Brown, 140 S.W.3d at 52 (observing bruises along the spine and under the eye).  
 111. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d at 410-11 (victim told psychologist of sexual abuse). 
 112. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Minn. 1989) (multiple parents informing prin-
cipal of teacher’s choking and pinching children); Hurd, 400 N.W.2d at 44 (camp counselor 
informing educator of another camp counselor’s sexual conduct with child campers).  
 113. See Brown, 140 S.W.3d at 57 (White, C.J., dissenting). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 56 (noting that all of the expert witnesses who discussed the stan-
dard at the trial court testified that the standard is difficult to apply in practice); 
KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 26 (“[W]hat constitutes reasonable suspicion as it may be 
differentiated from clinical hunches, professional impressions, and intuition, remains 
fuzzy.”); Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting and Poverty, 8 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 165, 196-98 (2000). Gail L. Zellman & Stephen Antler, Mandated Reporters 
and CPS: A Study in Frustration, PUB. WELFARE, Winter 1990, at 30, 37.  
 115. See, e.g., Brown, 140 S.W.3d at 54 (holding the “reasonable cause to suspect” 
standard constitutional under void for vagueness challenge); Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 63-65  
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that “involves a belief, based on evidence but short of proof . . . as to 
the existence of child abuse.”116 Requiring reports based on informa-
tion that simply indicates or suggests child abuse constitutes a low 
standard indeed. However, it is not an invitation to report whenever one 
has a vague, amorphous, or unspecified concern for a child’s welfare.117 
IV.   WHICH MEDIATORS ARE MANDATORY REPORTERS? 
 The initial reporting statutes from the mid-1960s required only 
medical professionals to be reporters, but before long reporting re-
quirements extended to a broad range of professionals who regularly 
came into contact with children, such as social workers, teachers, and 
day care operators.118 Today, up to forty different professions are identi-
fied as mandatory reporters,119 and in some states “any person” who has 
knowledge of abuse or suspects abuse is a mandatory reporter.120 
 Mandatory reporting laws vary by state; thus, the status of me-
diators as mandatory reporters for child abuse also varies by state. 
In twenty-two states, mediators are mandatory reporters. Of those 
states, only four expressly include mediators in the class of profes-
                                                                                                                     
(holding phrase “knows or has reason to believe” standard constitutional in face of void for 
vagueness and overbreadth challenges); Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d at 413 (finding “reasonable 
cause to suspect” standard constitutional in response to void for vagueness and over-
breadth challenges); Hurd, 400 N.W.2d at 45-46 (upholding “reasonable cause to suspect” 
standard in face of void for vagueness challenge); see also White v. State, 50 S.W.3d 31, 43 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the subjective standard to be constitutional). 
 116. Hurd, 400 N.W.2d at 46.  
 117. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING AND 
INVESTIGATION: POLICY GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING 9 (1988). While the reporting 
standard may be low, it is not low enough to reach the ridiculous result where the 
mere existence of a physical injury should result in a report of child abuse. Contra 
Brown, 140 S.W.3d at 57 n.8 (Mo. 2004) (White, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that mere 
physical injury is ipso facto evidence of abuse because an abuse scenario can be imag-
ined for any childhood injury). 
 118. Medical professionals spearheaded the expansion of mandatory reporters, in part 
because they feared that if medical professionals were the only mandatory reporters, par-
ents may refuse to seek medical care for their children. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 18; 
see also Editorial, Battered Child Legislation, 188 JAMA 136 (1964); John B. Reinhart & 
Elizabeth Elmer, The Abused Child, 188 JAMA 108 (1964). 
 119. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 19 (citing SANDY K. WURTELE & CINDY L. MILLER-
PERRIN, PREVENTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITY (1992)). The list 
of professions outside the mental health and medical professions is diverse and includes 
clergy, attorneys, film processors, police officers, and professionals who care for or super-
vise children (such as teachers and daycare providers).  
 120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 904 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 39.201(1)(a) (Supp. 2006); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1605 (2001); IND. CODE § 31-33-5 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§620.030 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 610 (Supp. 2004); MD. CODE. ANN. FAM. 
LAW §§ 5-705, -706 (LexisNexis 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2006); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 28-711 (Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:30 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
9:6-8.10, -8.10a (West 2002); N.M. STAT. § 32A-4-3 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2003); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7103 (Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (Supp. 2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.103 (Vernon Supp. 2005); UTAH 
CODE ANN. 1953 § 62A-4a-403 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-206 (2005). 
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sions identified as mandatory reporters.121 The remaining eighteen 
states indirectly require mediators to be mandatory reporters be-
cause “any person” who reasonably suspects abuse is designated a 
mandatory reporter.122  
 In the remaining twenty-eight states, the inquiry goes a step fur-
ther. Because mediation is a secondary profession for most media-
tors,123 one must first determine the reporting status of the media-
tor’s other profession.124 Indeed, mediators in family matters are 
drawn from a variety of primary professions, including social work, 
psychology, counseling, and law, and many of these professions are 
classified as mandatory reporters.125  This raises an issue: are report-
ing responsibilities a function of the reporter’s professional role or do 
they follow a reporter from one professional role to another? 
 Logically one would expect reporting requirements to attach only 
to one’s professional role. The first reporting statutes singled out 
physicians because, while providing medical treatment, they pre-
sumably would recognize signs of abuse that otherwise would be un-
recognizable to nonmedical observers.126 Reporting outside of the 
                                                                                                                     
 121. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2223(a)(1)(D) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 610 (Supp. 
2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509(a)(10) (2002); WIS. STAT. § 48.981 (2005). 
 122. See supra note 120. 
 123. See Edward Kruk, Practice Issues, Strategies, and Models: The Current State of 
the Art of Family Mediation, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 195, 197 (1998) (finding 
that, among a survey of Canadian family mediators, the respondents devoted on average 
34% of their professional practice to mediation and only 7% practiced mediation full-time).  
 124. One may argue that a permissive reporter mediator does, in fact, have a duty to 
report child abuse based on standards outside of the statutory reporting system. For 
example, the Model Family Standards advise mediators to “disclose a participant’s 
threat of . . . violence against any person to . . . the appropriate authorities if the mediator 
believes such threat is likely to be acted upon.” MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 
VII, cmt. C. However, the Model Family Standards specifically state that they “are not in-
tended to create legal rules” and are “aspirational in character” describing only “good prac-
tices for family mediators.” Id., Overview and Definitions (emphasis added). One could also 
argue that a Tarasoff-like duty requires mediators to report suspected child abuse to the 
authorities. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) 
(creating therapist duty to protect an intended victim of threats of serious violence). How-
ever, a Tarasoff-like duty does not require that the state be notified of the potential dan-
ger; the duty to notify is to the potential victim. See id. at 340. In fact, the defendant in Ta-
rasoff did report the victim’s danger to the police, but that report did not protect the thera-
pist from civil liability to the victim’s family. See id. at 339-40. Further, unlike mandatory 
reporting laws, which are enforced through criminal sanctions, a Tarasoff-like duty is en-
forced through remedies based on civil tort negligence remedies. See id. at 345. Tarasoff-
like requirements do not act as de facto mandatory reporting requirements. 
 125. While lawyers usually are not mandatory reporters, they are listed as mandatory 
reporters in four states. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
432B.220(4)(i) (Supp. 2005): OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 419B.010 (2003). For a discussion of the ramifications of lawyers acting as mandatory re-
porters of child abuse, see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and 
Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 203 (1992). 
 126. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE 
ABUSED CHILD (1963); KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 15.  
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medical provider role was not contemplated.127 Today, a few reporting 
statutes now specifically tie the duty to report to one’s occupational 
duties,128 and much of the discussion of mandatory reporting fo-
cuses on the effect that reporting requirements have on various 
professional occupations.129  
 If one’s professional role and the duties associated with that role 
determine whether a mediator is a mandatory reporter, determining 
which mediators should be mandatory reporters can be answered by 
comparing the roles associated with mediation and the legal and 
mental health professions in which most mediators are trained.130 
Mediators attempt to resolve disputes by assisting communication, 
encouraging understanding, and promoting voluntary decision mak-
ing.131  “Medical and mental health care professionals evaluate cli-
ents to diagnose clinical conditions and to determine an appropriate 
course of treatment” for any diagnosed conditions.132 Lawyers repre-
sent clients, providing them with advice on their legal rights and as-
serting those rights in courts of law.133 The mediation community has 
highlighted these basic differences in its attempts to assert inde-
pendence from those professions. For example, the Model Standards 
of Conduct for Mediators specifically state that the mediator role dif-
fers from other professional roles,134 and the Reporter’s Notes ex-
pressly distinguish “a mediator’s role and such other roles as being a 
                                                                                                                     
 127. Editorial, supra note 118 (arguing that other professions should be mandatory re-
porters when acting in their professional capacity); CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 126, at 
4-8 (discussing reporting in context of medical treatment and diagnosis); KALICHMAN, su-
pra note 92, at 15. 
 128. HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (1993 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 411 (Supp. 
2005). See also Op. Att’y Gen. Alaska No. 663-91-0286 (Feb. 21, 1991) (discussing Alaska 
Stat. § 47.17.020(a), which has since been repealed), available at 1991 WL 541971. In that 
opinion, the Alaska Attorney General concluded that mediators were mandatory reporters 
when acting as mediators if mediation was a task that was part of the performance of their 
professional duties. Id. 
 129. See generally KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 18-20 (clinical professions); MURRAY 
LEVINE & HOWARD J. DOUECK, THE IMPACT OF MANDATED REPORTING ON THE 
THERAPUETIC PROCESS: PICKING UP THE PIECES (1995); Norman Abrams, Addressing the 
Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in 
State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127 (2003); Mosteller, supra note 125 (discussing manda-
tory reporting and attorneys); Jane Rosien et al., Intent v. Practice: Incentives and Disin-
centives for Child Abuse Reporting by School Personnel, 1993 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 102.  
 130. The vast majority of family mediators are mental health care providers or lawyers. 
 131. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble; MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, su-
pra note 1, Overview and Definitions.  
 132. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 51; see also AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Introduction and Applicability 
(2002) (stating that the rules apply to all aspects of clinical, counseling, and research psy-
chology), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.pdf. 
 133. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble §2; id. R. 2.4(b) & cmt. 3 (distin-
guishing the roles of mediator and lawyer). 
 134. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1,  § VI(A)(5). 
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. . . mental health counselor, and the like.”135 But this dissociation is 
a struggle.  
 The Model Standards of Conduct also acknowledge that the mix-
ing of professional roles occurs,136 and the Reporter’s Notes specifi-
cally recognize that mediators necessarily draw upon the training 
and insights from their other professions when conducting media-
tions.137 Furthermore, like lawyers, mental health care professionals 
offer family mediation services under the umbrella of their profes-
sional practices.138 Because of the variability of commingling of pro-
fessional roles by individual mediators, disentangling the role of me-
diator from mental health professional or lawyer in any manner that 
can be applied as an industry standard may be impossible.  
 The commingling of professional roles into that of mediator sug-
gests that mental health care professionals and lawyers who have 
mandatory reporting requirements would be considered mandatory 
reporters when acting as mediators. Thus, a conservative approach is 
to conclude that mandatory reporting requirements follow a reporter 
from one professional role to that of a mediator. This is the approach 
taken in the Model Standards of Conduct for Family Mediators,139 in 
the Uniform Mediation Act,140 and by most authors advising media-
tion practitioners.141 While this works for some reporters, it does not 
make sense for reporters whose primary professions do not include 
mediation under the umbrella of their services. The more sound ap-
proach is to determine if mediation services are within the realm of 
services provided in a particular profession.142 If they are, then the 
                                                                                                                     
 135. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, Reporter’s Notes § V(H)(4) (discussing id. § 
VI(A)(5)), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/programs/adr/msoc/pdf/reportersnotes-
092005final.pdf.  
 136. Id. at Reporter’s Notes § VI(A)(5) (calling the practice of mixing the role of a me-
diator and the role of another profession problematic). 
 137. Id. at Reporter’s Notes § V(H)(4) (stating that the sharing of information from a 
mediator’s other profession should be done in a manner consistent with the other Stan-
dards, specifically those relating to party self-determination and mediator impartiality). 
 138. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing mediation services in 
conjunction with family counseling services).  
 139. The Model Family Standards advise mediators to “comply with applicable child 
protection laws” if a mediator has reasonable grounds for suspecting child abuse. MODEL 
FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § IX(C).  
 140. The UMA specifically contemplates that mediators will be mandatory reporters of 
abuse. “An exception [to mediation confidentiality] for child abuse and neglect is common 
in domestic mediation confidentiality statutes, and the [UMA] reaffirms these important 
policy choices states have made to protect their citizens.” UMA, supra note 68, § 6 cmt. 8.  
 141. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 200; Schepard, supra note 13, at 532-33; see 
also Gibson, supra note 5, at 51-52; Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for 
Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81, 114-16 (2003). 
 142. See Op. Att’y Gen. Alaska No. 663-91-0286 (Feb. 21, 1991) (concluding that practi-
tioners of the healing arts are mandatory reporters if they believe that mediation services 
constitute performance of their occupational duties), available at 1991 WL 541971. 
2007]               MEDIATORS AS MANDATORY REPORTERS 293 
 
reporting requirements from that profession would follow the profes-
sional into her work as a mediator.143 
 In states where mediators are not mandatory reporters by statute, 
mediators must look closely to the reporting statutes to determine if 
their primary or secondary profession is listed among those profes-
sions mandated to be reporters. If that profession is listed as a man-
datory reporter, the mediator should determine whether role and 
services that mediators provide are subsumed into the reporting pro-
fession’s role and services. If that is the case, the individual should 
be considered a mandatory reporter when acting as a mediator. If 
that is not the case, the person should not be a mandatory reporter 
when acting as a mediator. 
V.   ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MEDIATORS ACTING AS 
MANDATORY REPORTERS 
 Even though every state has at least some mediators who are 
mandatory reporters, the question remains whether having media-
tors serve as mandatory reporters makes sense from a policy per-
spective. Persuasive arguments exist on both sides of the issue.  
A.   Arguments in Favor of Mandatory Reporting 
 The complementary policy goals of family mediation and manda-
tory reporting are synergized when mediators are mandatory report-
ers. Mandatory reporting laws “expedite the identification of abused 
children . . . to prevent further abuse,”144 and mediation strives to 
produce better results for children than those provided through the 
adversarial process when the family structure is being reorganized 
through judicial proceedings.145 Improved outcomes for children who 
are victims of abuse are encompassed in both of these goals. Because 
mediators may be the first to hear reports of child abuse, getting 
such cases into the child protection system more quickly should re-
sult in the earlier provision of needed social or therapeutic services and 
thus provide better results for children in need of such services.146 
 Currently, family mediators are advised to take the “best interests 
of the child”147 into account in their mediations and thus would be 
                                                                                                                     
 143. See id. But see White v. State, 50 S.W.3d 31, 47-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming 
conviction of mandatory reporter for failing to report when information indicating need for 
report came to her outside of her professional work). 
 144. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 17. 
 145. See MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, Overview and Definitions. 
 146. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 200.  
 147. The standard “best interests of the child” has been criticized for many years. 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 302-04 (1988); James 
A. Cosby, How Parents and Children ‘Disappear’ In Our Courts—And Why It Need Not 
Ever Happen Again, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 285, 289 (2005) (arguing that this approach is 
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expected to ensure a child’s safety in abusive situations. The Model 
Family Standards specifically advise mediators to “assist partici-
pants in determining how to promote the best interests of chil-
dren.”148 Also, some state custody mediation statutes require media-
tors to act in the child’s best interests.149  
 Mandatory reporting requirements also prevent the possibility of 
mediators failing to act. Currently, mediators who are not mandatory 
reporters have no obligations to bring revelations of abuse made dur-
ing the course of mediation—even if horrific—to anyone’s atten-
tion.150 Despite the fact that inaction defeats mediation’s goal of 
achieving a better outcome for the abused child, mediator behavior 
along these lines is a distinct possibility. Absent a statutory duty to 
report, some mediators may believe that their commitment to gen-
eral notions of mediation confidentiality and promises of confidential-
ity to mediating parties is more important than reporting a reason-
able suspicion or even a strong intuition of abuse.151  
 Mandatory reporting also furthers the goal of consistency in me-
diation. The lack of consensus regarding whether mediators should 
be mandatory reporters divides the mediation profession into groups 
of mandatory reporters and permissive reporters.152 At a minimum 
this makes the mediation profession appear to be confused and to 
lack consistent standards.153 As the mediation community continues 
                                                                                                                     
“overly broad and overly rigid”); Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests 
of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 203 
(2004) (arguing that the phrase is overly legalized and ignores real human problems). One 
particularly stinging criticism is that it is “ill defined, broadly encompassing, highly reac-
tive to social trends and fads, and [is] systematically changing in response to the continu-
ally emerging research findings on children of divorce.” SAPOSNEK, supra note 5, at 7.  
 148. MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § VIII. The Model Family Standards 
give suggestions for how mediators should help parents best utilize mediation to promote 
the best interests of children, from suggesting that the mediator refer parents to a special-
ist in child development to help children cope with the consequences of family reorganization to 
discussing the level of detail that should be in parenting plans. Id. at § VIII(A)(1)-(5).  
 149. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3011, 3020, 3161 (West 2005). See also Ricci, supra note 13, at 
402-03. 
 150. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing the permissive report-
ing of suspected child abuse). 
 151. Confidentiality protection is central to the mediation process, and its importance 
is reflected in statutes and case law. See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text. 
 152. This problem exists in the twenty-eight states where mediators are not already 
subject to mandatory reporting requirements. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying 
text (discussing states using the primary profession method of identifying mandatory re-
porters). Despite the fact that this problem does not exist in the twenty-two states where 
mediators are explicitly or implicitly required to be mandatory reporters, this dichotomy 
affects the perception of the mediation profession nationwide.   
 153. This inconsistency comes into play when comediators with different reporting re-
sponsibilities hear revelations of abuse. The mediator who is a reporter has a duty to re-
port the abuse to the authorities and is subject to criminal and professional sanction if she 
does not do so. The nonreporter mediator, on the other hand, who hears the very same ad-
mission of abuse in the same mediation, has no reporting responsibilities whatsoever. 
2007]               MEDIATORS AS MANDATORY REPORTERS 295 
 
its march toward professionalization, this level of inconsistency will 
become untenable.154  Furthermore, inconsistent reporting require-
ments may be confusing to family mediation participants when they 
try to understand the process, select mediators, and use different 
mediators at various times in the family dispute.155 Indeed, it could 
potentially lead to a situation where mediating parties may refuse to 
accept mediators who are mandatory reporters in favor of mediators 
who are not mandatory reporters.  
B.   Arguments Against Mandatory Reporting 
 In the absence of mandatory reporting requirements, other ave-
nues are available for mediators to report child abuse. For instance, 
people who are not mandatory reporters are encouraged to report 
abuse as permissive reporters.156 Permissive reporting is not incon-
sistent with mediation confidentiality because threats of harm and 
ongoing criminal conduct have no confidentiality protection and may 
                                                                                                                     
Thus, inaction for one may result in professional and criminal sanction, but for the other, 
inaction has no consequences. 
 154. See generally Craig McEwen, Giving Meaning to Mediator Professionalism, DISP. 
RES. MAG. Spring 2005, at 3; Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, Eyes on the Prize: The 
Struggle for Professionalism, DISP. RES. MAG., Spring 2005, at 13. 
 155. Mediation in child custody disputes may occur at any time between the initial dis-
pute over custody until the child turns eighteen years old. See SAPOSNEK, supra note 5, at 
148-49 (discussing future modifications of child custody arrangements and seeking media-
tion before court action in such cases). 
 156. Every state except Oregon statutorily allows permissive reporting. ALA. CODE § 
26-14-4 (1992 & Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(b) (2004 & Supp. 2005); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 13-3620(F) (2004 & Supp. 2005); ARK CODE ANN. §12-12-507(a) (2003 & Supp. 
2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.7(b), -(f) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(3) 
(2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. §17a-103(a) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2006); D.C. 
CODE § 4-1321.03(c) (2001); FLA. STAT. § 39.201(1)(a) (Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-
5(d) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.3 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § S16-1605 (2001); 325 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2001 & Supp. 2005); IND. CODE § 31-33-5 (2003 & Supp. 2005); IOWA 
CODE § 232.69(2) (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-2223(a)(2) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
620.030(1) (West 2004); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 609(B) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 4011-A(3) (2004); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§5-705(a)(1) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS. 
ch. 119, § 51A (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.624 (2005); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(3)(b) 
(2003); MISS. CODE ANN. §43-21-353(1) (2004 & Supp. 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.110(4) 
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(3) (2005); NEB. REV. ST. §28-711 (1995 & Supp. 2002); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220(5) (2002 & Supp. 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. 1978 § 32A-4-3(A) (2003); N.Y. 
SOC. SERV. LAW § 414 (Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §7B-301 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
50-25.1-10 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(B) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 
7103(A)(1)(d) (1998 & Supp. 2006); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-
11-3 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510(C) (Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 
(1998 & Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
261.101(a) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(1) (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 
4913(b) (2001 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509(A)(10) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE 
26.44.030(3) (2004); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-1 (2004); WIS. STAT. 48.981(2)(c)(d) (2005); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (2005). 
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be reported to the authorities.157 Permissive reporters, by definition, 
have the discretion to decide whether to make a report to the au-
thorities; in some cases, the mediator may decide that the benefit of a 
report is outweighed by a more effective resolution through media-
tion.158 In those cases where reporting would do more harm to the 
child and the family, allowing mediators the discretion to refrain 
from reporting is consistent with mediation’s policy of arriving at 
outcomes that serve mediation parties better than court adjudica-
tion.159 However, it is unclear whether mediators who are permissive 
reporters are qualified to make this decision. 
 Mandatory reporting may also have the unintended consequence 
of inviting abuse of the mediation process. Because legal standards 
for awarding child custody take into account and penalize poor par-
enting, parents often compete with each other as to who is the “bet-
ter” parent,160 which can generate claims that the other parent is less 
qualified to care for the children.161 In an environment of pervasive 
competition and distrust, certain incidents may be misconstrued or 
exaggerated, resulting in unwarranted reports from mediators who 
misunderstand the reporting standard. Because the subsequent in-
vestigation can be quite stressful and unpleasant,162 such improper 
                                                                                                                     
 157. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. Additionally, admissions of prior 
abuse may be considered threats of future abuse and thereby lose their confidentiality pro-
tection. Recurrence rates of abuse for families receiving treatment for child abuse have 
been reported to be around 33%. DEBORAH DARO, CONFRONTING CHILD ABUSE 81, 121 
(1988); David J. Kolko, Child Physical Abuse, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD 
MALTREATMENT, 21, 41 (John E.B. Meyers et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (citing R. MALINOSKY-
RUMMEL ET AL., INDIVIDUALIZED BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION FOR PHYSICALLY ABUSIVE AND 
NEGLECTFUL FAMILIES: AN EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY INTERACTION SKILLS PROJECT 
(1991) (paper presented at the 25th Annual Conference of the Association for the Ad-
vancement of Behavior Therapy)). 
 158. Many mandatory reporters refuse to report abuse because of a belief that report-
ing causes more problems for families and children than it solves. See infra notes 174-78 
and accompanying text.  
 159. See MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, Overview and Definitions. 
 160. Marilyn S. McKnight & Stephen K. Erickson, The Plan to Separately Parent Chil-
dren After Divorce, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION 129, 130 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 
2004); JANET R. JOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD 242 (1997). 
Although legal standards may play a minimal role in mediation, parties nonetheless “bar-
gain in the shadow of the law” and can be influenced by legal precedent. See Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 161. McKnight & Erickson, supra note 160, at 130-31. 
 162. Even when reports of abuse are determined to be unfounded or unsubstantiated, 
investigations into whether abuse has occurred have been described as “at best, intrusive, 
and at worst, coercive.” KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 32. Furthermore, the social stigma 
of a report is compounded if caseworkers find it necessary to interview friends, relatives, 
and others who know the family. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Unfounded Allegations—A 
New Child Abuse Problem, 83 PUB. INT. 18, 23 (1986); Zellman & Antler, supra note 
114, at 36 (1990) (calling such investigations “unavoidable trauma”). Cf. David 
Finkelhour, Is Child Abuse Overreported?, PUB. WELFARE, Winter 1990, at 22, 26-27 
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reports constitute objectionable infringements on party self-
determination. Furthermore, the competitive environment may also 
result in dubious abuse allegations where a malicious or desperate 
parent may make a deliberately false accusation of abuse against the 
other parent simply to invoke the mediator’s reporting require-
ment.163 Thus, mediators may become unwitting conduits for dubious 
or fraudulent allegations of abuse.  
 Dubious or fraudulent abuse allegations present a problem for 
mediators, as they do with other mandatory reporters, because re-
porters are routinely advised to refrain from conducting in-depth in-
vestigations into allegations of abuse and to simply report reasonable 
suspicions of abuse.164 Mediators may probe an allegation or a revela-
tion to confirm a reasonable suspicion,165 yet a malicious but credible 
allegation must be reported.166 In such instances the false allegation 
destroys the integrity of the mediation process.167  
 Mandatory reporting also has a negative impact on mediation’s 
core values. Of course, the most dramatic impacts occur when a re-
port is made. Expectations of mediation confidentiality are dashed, 
an accused party is likely to believe the mediator is biased, and the 
parties are at the mercy of what CPS determines should happen 
next. But even when reporting is not necessary, mediation’s core val-
ues can be affected. For example, what are mediators to do when 
they have a sneaking suspicion of abuse? If mediators are to take the 
best interests of the child into account, they should follow up on the 
issue to determine whether there is reasonable suspicion or not. No 
                                                                                                                     
(arguing that there is no evidence to Besharov’s claims that child protection investiga-
tions entail “unavoidable trauma”). 
 163. See Thomas E. Schacht, Prevention Strategies to Protect Professionals and Fami-
lies Involved in High-Conflict Divorce, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 565, 573 n.27 (2000) 
(stating that parents making false allegations may try to “gild the accusation with a pro-
fessional aura” by discussing the false accusation with a mandatory reporter knowing the 
reporter must report abuse to the authorities); see also Corey L. Gordon, False Allegations 
of Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 135 NEW L.J. 687, 687 (1985) (noting the strategic use 
of abuse allegations in divorce and custody proceedings); Paula D. Salinger, True or False 
Accusations?: Protecting Victims of Child Sexual Abuse During Custody Disputes, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 693, 700-01 (2001) (calling false accusations of child abuse a “reality of 
child custody disputes”). One empirical study found that 8% of all contested custody cases 
involve allegations of abuse. See Julia A. McIntosh & Ronald J. Prinz, The Incidence of Al-
leged Sexual Abuse in 603 Family Court Cases, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 96 (1993) (discuss-
ing instances of sexual abuse allegations in custody disputes).  
 164. People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); TAYLOR, supra 
note 4, at 202-03; Renninger et al., supra note 91, at 22.  
 165. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. 
 166. SAPOSNEK, supra note 147, at 294. See also supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text. 
 167. Mediators have an ethical duty to maintain the quality of the mediation process. 
2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § VI. Cf. MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, 
Overview and Definitions (stating that one of the major functions of the Model Family 
Standards is to “promote public confidence in mediation as a process for resolving 
family disputes”). 
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matter whether that sneaking suspicion turns into something 
more, the parties’ self-determination has been compromised to 
some extent because the mediator has moved from discussion fa-
cilitator to discussion leader.168  
 Even routine mediator behavior may result in unintended conse-
quences during mediation. Standard mediation protocol dictates that 
mediators disclose their status as mandatory reporters of child abuse 
in their opening remarks in the mediation.169 Although this disclo-
sure serves many important purposes;170 it may prevent discussion of 
issues needed to maximize the parties’ self-determination. One pur-
pose of disclosure is an implicit warning that disclosure may lead to 
the loss of custody of the children and/or criminal penalties against 
one or both of the parties.171 Thus, fearing the consequences of speak-
ing freely, some parties may entirely avoid speaking of legitimate 
child abuse issues.172 Parties may withhold information for a variety 
of reasons, but the fact that self-censorship may occur as a result 
of requiring mediators to be mandatory reporters is troubling be-
cause it compromises one of mediation’s primary benefits—
increasing the quality of the parties’ communication to address 
emotionally charged issues.173  
                                                                                                                     
 168. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
 169. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § V(C), (D); MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, 
supra note 1, § VII(A), -(B). In practice, this disclosure is also made in premediation con-
firmation letters and in the contractual agreement to mediate that mediators ask parties 
to sign. MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § VII(A), (B). 
 170. The disclosure of one’s reporting requirements helps establish the parties’ under-
standing of mediation’s confidentiality limits, creates a safe and trusting environment for 
the ensuing discussion, and serves as a means for obtaining the parties’ informed consent 
that reporting is a possible consequence of mediation. See, e.g., KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, 
MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 263 (3d ed. 2004); MOORE, supra note 32, at 160-61, 
211-12. See also Karen L. Steingberg et al., Effects of Legally Mandated Child-Abuse Re-
ports on the Therapeutic Relationship: A Survey of Psychotherapists, 67 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 112, 119-20 (discussing the need for psychotherapists to disclose their 
reporting requirements to their clients to obtain their informed consent to making a re-
port). One commentator questions whether a mere disclosure of one’s status as a manda-
tory reporter can truly act as informed consent. Randall A. Butz, Reporting Child Abuse 
and Confidentiality in Counseling, 1985 SOC. CASEWORK J. CONTEMP. SOC. WORK 83, 88-89 
(discussing the paradox of disclosing one’s status as a mandatory reporter to seek informed 
consent when the impact of the disclosure is not understood until it is too late). 
 171. Criminal charges may be brought against a parent who has failed to report an 
abusive coparent or spouse. See, e.g., Scott A. Davidson, When Is Parental Discipline Child 
Abuse? The Vagueness of Child Abuse Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 403, 414-15 
(1995); Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence: Tort Liability for Failing to Protect Chil-
dren from Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 405, 450 (1994). 
 172. This is the case in psychiatry cases. Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Re-
quiring Psychiatrists to Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
449, 450-51 (1991) (reporting that mandatory reporting deterred psychiatry patients’ dis-
closures about child abuse). 
 173. Some parties do not heed this warning and do discuss child abuse issues. See infra 
notes 190-93 and accompanying text. In these cases, the mediator’s reporting status may 
act as a means of encouraging a revelation of abuse.  
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VI.   MEDIATORS SHOULD BE MANDATORY REPORTERS OF ABUSE 
 Determining if mediators should be mandatory reporters begs the 
question of whether we should have mandatory reporting require-
ments at all. Despite legitimate criticisms of mandatory reporting,174 
the desire to protect abused children through mandatory reporting is 
perceived to be as much of a moral and ethical duty as it is a legal 
duty.175 Consequently, mandatory reporting laws are widely accepted 
as an integral component in the fight against child abuse,176 even by 
their strongest critics.177 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Critics present four arguments against mandatory reporting requirements: the 
number of reports funneled into the system interferes with child protection, reporting is 
harmful to children and families, reporting is destructive to helping relationships, and the 
reporting standard is overly vague. They argue that mandatory reporting interferes with 
child protection by pointing out that high numbers of reports turn out to be “unsubstanti-
ated.” See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 5, 7 (2003) [here-
inafter CHILD MALTREATMENT] (reporting that nearly 57.7% of an estimated number of 2.9 
million referrals to state CPS agencies were determined to be unfounded or unsubstanti-
ated). The high number of reports falling into these classifications present serious institu-
tional burdens, as valuable resources are allocated to investigate nonprioritized reports, 
thereby reducing the availability of services for those most in need. See, e.g., KALICHMAN, 
supra note 92, at 31; Besharov, supra note 162, at 19. Noting an overly clogged and ineffec-
tive child protection system, many mandated reporters refuse to report suspected child 
abuse because they see no benefit of such a report. See, e.g., GAIL L. ZELLMAN & ROBERT M. 
BELL, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND, CASE CHARACTERISTICS, AND PROTECTIVE 
AGENCY RESPONSE IN MANDATED CHILD ABUSE REPORTING 88-90 (1990) (discussing the ef-
fect concerns of CPS efficacy has on reporting decisions); Krisann M. Alvarez et al., Why 
Are Professionals Failing to Initiate Mandated Reports of Child Maltreatment, and Are 
There Any Empirically Based Training Programs to Assist Professionals in the Reporting 
Process? 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 563, 564 (2004) (noting that a negative view of 
child protection agencies is a hindrance to reporting). Furthermore, many mental health 
providers believe that reporting can interfere with opportunities for effective intervention 
by straining the therapist-patient relationship, even resulting in an end of therapy. Ka-
lichman & Craig, supra note 91, at 88 (reporting that 31% of psychologists indicated re-
porting has had either harmful or very harmful effects on therapy); Renninger et al., supra 
note 91, at 22 (reporting that one in six psychologists expressed concern about a report’s 
impact on therapy). As a result, the relationship that actually may offer the greatest hope 
of preventing further abuse may be irreparably damaged. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 
31-32. Finally, several studies indicate that many mandatory reporters refuse to report 
suspected abuse for fear of causing further harm to the child or to the family by upsetting 
an already delicate family situation and through the trauma associated with being investi-
gated. See, e.g., Alvarez et al., supra note 174, at 566 (citing seven studies with such find-
ings); Besharov, supra note 162, at 23 (calling such investigations “unavoidably trau-
matic”); Kalichman et al., supra note 91, at 86 (reporting that 37% of survey respondents 
indicated that reporting would have a negative effect on the family); Zellman & Antler, su-
pra note 114, at 36. Cf. Finkelhour, supra note 162, at 26-27 (arguing that there is no evi-
dence supporting claims that child protection investigations involve gross violations of pa-
rental and family privacy or entail “unavoidable trauma”). 
 175. See, e.g., SAPOSNEK, supra note 147, at 298; Stephen K. Benekhe & Robert Kin-
schreff, Ethics Rounds: Must a Psychologist Report Past Abuse? MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., 
May 2002, at 56-57; Kevin O’Connor, Professional Conflicts and Issues in Child Abuse Re-
porting and Treatment, CAL. PSYCHOL., July 1, 1989, at 22-23. 
 176. See, e.g., Kalichman & Craig, supra note 91, at 88 (reporting that 94% of survey 
respondents believed that mandatory reporting laws are necessary); Kalichman et al., su-
pra note 91, at 87 (reporting that 85% of survey respondents believed that mandatory re-
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 The ultimate question to ask when determining whether media-
tors should be mandatory reporters is: Are the benefits from manda-
tory reporting worth the burdens it places on mediating parties and 
the mediation process? Because child protection is such a compelling 
state interest,178 the need for “private” conversations in mediation 
must be quite high to overcome that state interest. Reporting stat-
utes override policies of confidentiality in myriad professional set-
tings where the professional relationship is much closer than that of 
mediator-mediating party.179 Furthermore, use of mandatory report-
ing laws to promote the state’s interest in child protection has long 
taken precedence over the burdens associated with being subject to a 
child abuse investigation.180 More importantly, however, the goals of 
reporting and of mediation are already complimentary, and disen-
tangling the two is virtually impossible.181 When child abuse comes to 
light in mediation, it is neither in the child’s best interests nor in so-
ciety’s best interests to allow the abuse to continue. Forbidding me-
diators from refusing to act when told of horrific acts of abuse is a 
hole in the reporting system.182 Requiring mediators to act as manda-
tory reporters of abuse is sound public policy. 
 Adopting this policy would also provide other benefits to the me-
diation profession. In this era when the mediation community is fo-
cused on issues of professionalization,183 mandatory reporting would 
clear up inconsistent reporting requirements that make the media-
tion community look unprofessional. Finally, even the possibility of 
enacting a reporting requirement for mediators would bring the re-
porting requirement to the forefront of discussions about mediation 
—even in those states where mediators are mandatory reporters.184 
                                                                                                                     
porting laws are necessary). See also Salina M. Renninger et al., Psychologists’ Knowledge, 
Opinions, and Decision-Making Processes Regarding Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting 
Laws, 33 PROF. PSYCH. RES. & PRAC. 19, 22 (2002) (reporting respondents being fairly sat-
isfied with mandatory reporting laws). 
 177. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Responding to Child Sexual Abuse: The Need for a 
Balanced Approach, 4 SEXUAL ABUSE CHILD. 135, 144 (1994). 
 178. “[The state’s] sovereignty is offended by child abuse.” People v. Cavaiani, 432 
N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). See also supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.  
 179. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. See also Randall A. Butz, Report-
ing Child Abuse and Confidentiality in Counseling, 1985 SOC. CASEWORK J. CONTEMP. SOC. 
WORK 83, 88 (“The need to protect defenseless children outweighs the need to preserve ab-
solute confidentiality during [medical] treatment.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Kottmeyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 691 (6th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Heck, 327 
F.3d 492, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2003); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993); see also 
BESHAROV, supra note 117, at 12 (stating that unsubstantiated reports are a necessary evil 
to ensure the safety of abused children and in some cases can result in referrals to social 
service agencies). 
 181. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 184. Currently, only four of the twenty-two states where mediators are mandatory re-
porters explicitly require mediators to act as mandatory reporters by identifying mediators 
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For these reasons, states should revise their reporting laws to include 
mediators among the professionals who are mandatory reporters.  
A.   Fraudulent Abuse Claims and an Overburdened System 
 As mentioned earlier, having mediators act as mandatory report-
ers raises a number of legitimate concerns. One prevalent worry 
about mandatory reporting is addressing fraudulent or malicious 
claims of child abuse. Another important concern is increasing the 
number of reports to an already overburdened child protection system.  
 Since some parties may take advantage of a mediator’s reporting 
requirements, mediators could become conduits for specious abuse al-
legations.185 To protect themselves and the process from being taken 
advantage of in that way, some permissive reporter mediators would 
prefer to rely on their discretion when faced with reporting deci-
sions.186 As most mandatory reporters know, rather than destroying 
mediator discretion, mandatory reporting simply redirects where 
that discretion is exercised. When making a report of specific circum-
stances of suspected abuse, the reporter may disclose his or her per-
sonal belief that the child has not been abused.187 If mediators dis-
close their personal beliefs in their reports to CPS, CPS investigators 
will take the reporter’s subjective beliefs about accusations of abuse 
into account during their investigation processes.  
 Another potential drawback is that reports from mediators may 
exacerbate the systemic problems already present in the child protec-
tion system.188 It is unclear, however, how many additional reports of 
suspected abuse CPS agencies would actually receive if all mediators 
were mandatory reporters. A recent survey of Kansas mediators’ ex-
perience as mandatory reporters may shed some light on the answer. 
Kansas is one of four states that includes mediators among the pro-
fessions that are mandatory reporters for suspected child abuse.189  
                                                                                                                     
among the professions that are mandatory reporters. See supra notes 121-22 and accom-
panying text. The remaining eighteen states only implicitly require mediators to be man-
datory reporters by virtue of the fact that anyone who suspects child abuse is a mandatory 
reporter. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
 187. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. 1989). Cf. People v. Cavaiani, 432 
N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing the reporter’s conclusion that his suspi-
cions of abuse were unfounded because it usurped the state’s right to determine whether 
abuse had occurred).  
 188. See supra note 174. 
 189. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2223(a)(1)(D) (2006). Art Thompson, now the Dispute Reso-
lution Coordinator of the Kansas Office of Judicial Administration, testified in support of 
making mediators mandatory reporters in Kansas’ Dispute Resolution Act of 1986. Mr. 
Thompson recalls no opposition to the proposition of mediators acting as mandatory re-
porters for child abuse. E-mail from Art Thompson, Dispute Resolution Coordinator, Kan. 
Office of Judicial Admin., to author (July 26, 2005, 06:24 CST) (on file with author). 
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 To determine how many mediators had reported abuse to the CPS 
authorities, the Dispute Resolution Coordinator of the Kansas Office 
of Judicial Administration distributed an informal questionnaire to 
all court-approved family mediators in Kansas190 asking whether 
they had reported child abuse to the authorities.191 Only 24% of re-
spondents (six of twenty-five)192 indicated that they had reported 
suspected abuse to CPS during the previous five years.193 For this 
sample of twenty-five, the total number of reports per mediator per 
year was less than one.194 Kansas has a total of 256 court-approved 
family mediators.195  
 If one assumes the rate of reporting is the same for the family 
mediators who did not respond to this survey, that calculation would 
translate into thirty-one reports of potential abuse per year. Compar-
ing the high number of CPS reports to the number of mediators’ es-
timated reports reveals that mediators apparently accounted for only 
a tiny fraction of the 27,304 reports filed with Kansas CPS authori-
ties in 2003, the most recent year for which statistics are available.196 
Assuming that these numbers are representative of the number of 
reports mediators will add to the system, the impact on the child pro-
tection system will be negligible.  
B.   Minimizing Reporting’s Impact on Mediation’s Core Values 
 While the policy goals of mandatory reporting and mediation are com-
plimentary, once a report is required, mediation’s core values succumb to 
the reporting requirement: certain mediation communications are not con-
fidential, parties lose their self-determination, and mediators are likely to 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Art Thompson, Dispute Resolution Coordinator of the Kansas Office of Judicial 
Administration, sent the questionnaire to the office’s e-mail listserv for family court ap-
proved mediators, which at the time totaled approximately 256 mediators. Of that number, 
100 conduct most of the court-ordered family mediations. E-mail from Art Thompson, Dis-
pute Resolution Coordinator, Kan. Office of Judicial Admin., to author (Nov. 3, 2005, 09:42 
CST) (on file with author). 
 191. The survey’s first question asked if respondents had reported child abuse to CPS 
in their capacity as a “mediator/mandatory reporter” in the last five years. A copy of the 
questionnaire is on file with the author. Even though the survey is draped in mediation is-
sues, it is possible that respondents may have answered “yes” due to reports of abuse roles 
other than as mediator. Nevertheless, the survey responses do provide insight into questions re-
lated to the experience of Kansas mediators and is used for those indicative purposes. 
 192. Based on the limited number of responses, the ability to draw conclusions from 
the data is limited. 
 193. These six mediators estimated they made anywhere from 1 to 8 reports per me-
diator over the five-year period, with the majority listing 1 or 2 reports during the time 
frame. The total number of estimated reports over the five-year period was 13 to 15. 
 194.  The number of reports per mediator per yeard was 0.12. 
 195. See supra note 190. 
 196. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 174, at 10 tbl. 2-1.  Although not the product of 
rigorous statistical analysis, the basic numerical analysis supporting this conclusion 
merely illustrates that requiring mediators to be mandatory reporters of child abuse may not 
significantly compound the systemic problems with the child abuse investigatory process. 
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be seen by one party as biased. While reconciliation is impossible, protect-
ing and supporting mediation’s core values as much as possible in a man-
datory reporting environment is essential for mediation’s continued vital-
ity in family matters. This section is intended to assist mediators with re-
porting requirements to minimize the impact of mandatory reporting on 
mediation’s core values. 
1.   Party Self-Determination 
 Party self-determination is the most vulnerable mediation core 
value when mediators are mandatory reporters. This is because once 
a report is made to CPS, the mediation parties cannot control the 
outcome of the upcoming CPS investigation.197 While the loss of self-
determination is socially acceptable when reporting is warranted,198 
it is an objectionable infringement when reporting is unwarranted. 
 Minimizing mandatory reporting’s effect on party self-
determination is largely an educational task—making sure media-
tors understand what mandatory reporting requires of them.199 For 
example, some mediators may become overzealous in their capacity 
as mandatory reporters, inquiring about or steering the parties’ con-
versation to issues of potential child abuse, even in cases where there 
are no indications that abuse is an issue. Other than disclosing their 
status as mandatory reporters, mediators should not inject the issue 
of child abuse into mediation without a party somehow leading the 
discussion to the topic. While it may seem obvious, mediators should 
remember that their primary role, facilitating the parties’ resolution 
of their dispute, should not take a back seat to abstract worries of po-
tential child abuse.200  
 Mediators must also have a good understanding of when reporting 
is necessary so they can preserve the parties’ self-determination by 
refusing to report when reporting is not required. No matter which 
                                                                                                                     
 197. People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); TAYLOR, supra 
note 4, at 204. See also supra note 162 and accompanying text.  
 198. See supra note 87. 
 199. 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, § IV (discussing competence); MODEL 
FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § XIII (discussing competence). See also supra notes 102-
12 and accompanying text and infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text. 
 200. This recommendation is consistent with the facilitative or ellicitive model of me-
diation that is prevalent in divorce and child custody mediation. In this model of media-
tion, mediators let the parties determine the issues that are to be discussed. See generally 
Riskin, supra note 42, at 45 (discussing facilitative mediation); Riskin, supra note 1, at 24, 
30-31 (opining that the term ellicitive is more descriptive of what actually happens in me-
diation compared to the term facilitative). Putting abstract worries of abuse behind other 
professional concerns is also important for other mandatory reporters. See, e.g., Renninger 
et al., supra note 91, at 22-23 (discussing psychologists); Steingberg et al., supra note 170, 
at 120 (discussing therapists); see also 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, Preamble; 
MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, Overview and Definitions.  
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reporting standard a mediator is operating under,201 the mediator 
should report when she feels there is enough evidence to support a 
belief of abuse regardless of whether there is proof of abuse.202 To 
help mediators conceptualize the reporting standard, some general 
guidelines are in order.203  When mediators hear remarks that rise 
only to the level of innuendo, allusions, hints, or other indirect refer-
ences to potential child abuse, the reporting obligation has not been 
triggered.204 By definition, remarks of this type are indeterminate 
and are not capable of clear interpretation. Similarly, patently false 
accusations of child abuse should not be reported. 
 The situation becomes more complex as the mediator’s beliefs 
about abuse develop into a reasonable suspicion. If the mediator’s be-
liefs fall into the gray area of a hunch or sneaking suspicion of abuse, 
the mediator’s reporting requirement is not directly affected.205 How-
ever, the mediator’s focus must become the best interests of the 
child.206 Thus, the stronger the suspicion, the greater the media-
tor’s need to probe the issue of abuse. A fleeting suspicion need not 
be pursued. 
 If these suspicions do not go away, mediators should remind the 
parties of their status as mandatory reporters of abuse. While a gen-
tle warning may suppress party self-determination in certain ways,207 
it can also be reasonably expected to enhance party self-
determination. In response to the reminder, the parties may choose 
to address the mediator’s sneaking suspicions, confirm the suspi-
cions, or even decide to terminate the mediation, the ultimate act of 
party self-determination.   
 Once the reporting standard is met and a report must be made,208 
it is inappropriate to continue the mediation. Doing so would lead the 
parties to believe that their self-determination remains intact, when, 
in fact, it is extremely limited.209 Thus, the mediator should begin 
                                                                                                                     
 201. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 203. Because each reporting situation has its own idiosyncrasies, these guidelines are 
meant to be just that: general guidelines to assist mediators with understanding their re-
porting requirements. 
 204. See BESHAROV, supra note 117, at 9. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text. 
 208. For further discussions regarding what kinds of revelations meet the standard for 
making a report, see supra Part III.B and see infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.  
 209. Failing to inform the parties of an imminent report contravenes the open and 
honest conversation that the mediation process is designed to promote. 2005 MODEL 
STANDARDS, supra note 1, § VI(A)(4) (“A mediator should promote honesty and candor be-
tween and among all participants, and a mediator shall not knowingly misrepresent any 
material fact or circumstance in the course of a mediation.”). Cf. Maureen C. Kenny, Child 
Abuse Reporting: The Clinician’s Dilemma, 13 J. PROF. COUNSELOR 7, 13 (1998) (noting 
that failing to inform counseling clients of an upcoming report is dishonest); Robert J. Ra-
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terminating the mediation session.210 However, before terminating 
the mediation, mediators can encourage limited instances of party 
self-determination. For example, if allegations of child abuse are 
made in caucus, the mediator may have a conversation with the ac-
cuser about the best way to disclose the information to the accused.211 
The mediator may also encourage the parties to visit family service 
agencies and help the parties understand how to pursue their legal 
rights and responsibilities in light of the report.212 In some cases, me-
diators may ask the parties if there is any information that they 
would like to have included in the report, such as a rebuttal to an ac-
cusation of abuse.  
 Understanding when reporting is required is one of the most diffi-
cult aspects of being a mandatory reporter.213 Because reporting 
abuse has such a devastating effect on the parties’ self-
determination, having a good understanding of the reporting stan-
dard should result in more accurate reports of abuse. Ensuring accu-
rate reports of abuse is the best way to minimize reporting’s effect on 
the parties’ self-determination.  
2.   Mediator Neutrality 
 The true test of a mediator’s neutrality in a mandatory reporting 
environment comes when the issue of abuse unexpectedly surfaces. 
These situations are among the most difficult professional and ethi-
cal circumstances mediators face.214 A mediator’s initial act of either 
minimizing or legitimizing allegations of abuse may appear hostile to 
either or both parties and may compromise the mediator’s appear-
ance of neutrality.215 Recognizing that an initial allegation or admis-
sion standing alone may not necessarily meet the reporting standard, 
mediators should first attempt to confirm or deny a reasonable suspi-
                                                                                                                     
cusin & J. Kirk Felsman, Reporting Child Abuse: The Ethical Obligation to Inform 
Parents, 25 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 485, 485 (1986) (calling a psychiatrist’s 
failure to inform parents of a report “a deceptive act that violates a moral rule” absent 
compelling circumstances). 
 210. It is inappropriate to mediate terms and conditions of parenting when there are 
safety concerns for children and other institutions will decide who gets to make parenting 
decisions. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 204. See also MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, 
§ IX(C)(2). See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text (discussing the strategies for 
terminating a mediation session due to making a report). 
 211. See Brad Donohue et al., A Standardized Method of Diplomatically and Effectively 
Reporting Child Abuse to State Authorities: A Controlled Evaluation, 26 BEHAV. 
MODIFICATION 684, 697-98 (2002) (suggesting that clinician reporters ask nonperpetrating 
caregivers how to disclose the need for a report to the perpetrator). 
 212. MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, § IX(C)(1); TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 
203-04. 
 213. Besharov, supra note 177, at 143-44. 
 214. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 201. With apologies to Thomas Paine, these are the 
times that try mediators’ souls. 
 215. See id. at 174, 203; Love, supra note 43, at 945. 
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cion of abuse by gaining a better understanding of the revelation.216 
For example, statements that could lead to an unreasonable suspi-
cion of abuse may be based on a mistaken idea of what constitutes 
child abuse,217 an attempt to find out additional information to either 
confirm or deny a suspicion,218 or part of a strategy of bad-faith bar-
gaining to gain negotiation leverage.219  
 To determine if any of these possibilities apply, mediators should 
focus the conversation on specific acts and actions instead of conclu-
sory statements.220 Mediators should remember that trying to con-
firm a reasonable suspicion to determine whether to make a report is 
not the same as investigating whether or not abuse occurred.221  In 
the appropriate situation, mediators may act as educators on the law 
and facts, clarifying mistaken terms.222  
 Once the mediator confirms a reasonable suspicion of child abuse, 
the mediator’s utmost task is to safely terminate the mediation ses-
sion.223 Rather than abruptly calling the mediation to a halt, media-
tors should do their best to maintain the integrity of the process, 
primarily by maintaining their neutrality.224 This can be difficult and 
may seem counterintuitive, but it is the best mediator strategy for 
managing the difficult emotions associated with being accused of 
abuse.225 Maintaining mediator neutrality is also important because, 
due to the low the reporting standard, it is possible that the subse-
quent investigation may come back as inconclusive or unfounded.226 
Thus, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that the parties may work with 
the mediator again once the investigation is completed.227 Maintain-
ing mediator neutrality keeps that possibility open.   
                                                                                                                     
 216. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 203. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
 220. See SAPOSNEK, supra note 147, at 294; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 203. 
 221. See People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. 1989). See also supra Part III.B (discussing the reason-
able suspicion standard). 
 222. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 203. This can be part of the mediator’s norm-educating 
responsibilities in family mediation. See Waldman, supra note 47, at 727-32 (using a fam-
ily mediation as an example of the norm-educating model of mediation). 
 223. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 204-05. 
 224. Id. at 203. See also MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, supra note 1, §§ IV, IX (stating 
that mediators should “shape the mediation process,” including terminating the session ac-
cordingly when mediators recognize the family situation involves abuse or neglect and it 
affects their impartiality). 
 225. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 200, 205. 
 226. For example, in 2003, 57.7% of all reports of child abuse from professionals were 
determined to be unsubstantiated. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 174, at 7. 
 227. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 205. 
2007]               MEDIATORS AS MANDATORY REPORTERS 307 
 
 Part of terminating the session, barring compelling circum-
stances,228 is informing the parties of the need for a report.229 There is 
no one correct method for doing so.230 The task is difficult enough if 
both parties are aware of the accusation or revelation, but it is that 
much more difficult for the mediator when one party is accused of 
abuse and is unaware of the accusation. Informing the party without 
sounding accusatory is no simple task. 
 One method is to use the need for a report as a measured conver-
sation winding down the mediation. For example, after reminding 
the parties of the mediator’s status as a mandatory reporter of child 
abuse and acknowledging that he or she is required by law to make 
the report, a mediator should disclose the accusation or other infor-
mation without being accusatory.231 At this point, the mediator has 
the opportunity to let the parties know that no one has been con-
victed of any crime, because no proof of the alleged abuse has yet 
been established.232 Alternatively, the mediator may educate the parties 
about the institutions that will become involved once the report is made 
and what actions they are likely to take as part of the investigation.233  
 Even if a mediator follows the suggestions for terminating the 
process, an accused party may believe the mediator is biased. How-
ever, following these guidelines should help a mediator maintain 
both the quality of the process and a fundamental sense of treating 
both parties fairly in light of having to make a report.234  
3.   Confidentiality 
 The pressures mandatory reporting places on confidentiality arise 
once a mediator’s reporting requirement is triggered, because at that 
point there is no choice but to disclose mediation communications.235 
Some of the communications to be disclosed, such as a description of 
the suspected abuse, can constitute threats of harm or ongoing 
                                                                                                                     
 228. Compelling circumstances are those situations where the personal safety of the 
child, the accusing party, or the mediator is at risk. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 145; 
TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 205; Racusin & Felsman, supra note 209, at 486.  
 229. See SAPOSNEK, supra note 147, at 294; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 204; see also 
Kenny, supra note 209, at 1. 
 230. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 205 (advising mediators to seek guidance from oth-
ers in the field to determine how to have this conversation in specific situations). 
 231. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 204.  
 232. See Racusin & Felsman, supra note 209, at 487. 
 233. KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 145; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 204; see Donohue et 
al., supra note 211, at 696-98 (listing several skills associated with informing nonperpe-
trating caregivers of abuse). 
 234. See 2005 MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, §§ II, VI; MODEL FAMILY STANDARDS, 
supra note 1, §§ IV, VI. 
 235. See People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that 
once a reporter has a reasonable suspicion of child abuse, the reporter cannot make a de-
termination of whether abuse occurred on behalf of the state). 
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criminal conduct and, as a result, have no confidentiality protection 
regardless of whether a mediator is a reporter.236 However, a lack of 
confidentiality protection is not the same as a compelling mediator 
disclosure of mediation communications.  
 In making a report, a mediator’s difficulty lies with knowing the 
contours of what is confidential and what is not. A mediator’s goal in 
complying with the reporting requirement and mediation confidenti-
ality statutes should be to provide enough information to maximize 
the possibility of child protection while minimizing the breach of con-
fidentiality.237 Since the purpose of the disclosure is to protect chil-
dren, only information that assists CPS in making its determination 
of whether the child needs state protection should be disclosed.238 
Appropriate disclosures include: 
• the identity of the child, 
• the identity of the child’s parents or persons responsible for the 
child’s care, 
• the  suspected  perpetrator’s  name  and  relationship  to  the 
child (if any), 
• a description of the abuse or neglect, and 
• the identity of other people who have knowledge of the abuse.239 
Thus, when describing the circumstances of suspected abuse, media-
tors should limit their disclosures to the parties’ disclosures that 
support the suspicion of abuse and subsequently led to the reporting 
decision.240 If confronted with well-intentioned requests for informa-
tion outside of these parameters, mediators should communicate 
their concerns about reporting more information than required by 
law and ask how that information furthers the child’s protection.241 
                                                                                                                     
 236. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 237. See KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 148 (providing advice for health care providers 
who make reports). 
 238. See id.  
 239. This information is typical of the types of disclosures CPS agencies seek 
when a report of abuse is made. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEMS AND REFORM EFFORTS 
(2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/CPS-status03/state-policy 03/chapter3.htm#; U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE (2003), available at 
http://childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundationi.cfm.  
 240. See KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 149 (describing the contents of reports of sus-
pected abuse from psychologists). Additionally, mediators may include their subjective be-
lief of whether the child was abused. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 241. Id. See also Mary Ann Bromley & John A. Riolo, Complying with Mandated Child 
Protective Reporting: A Challenge for Treatment Professionals, 5 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT 
Q. 83, 92 (1988) (stating that reports should be limited to only the essential information 
which is necessary for the child protective authorities to initiate their investigation). 
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Information not germane to child protection maintains its mediation 
confidentiality protection and should not be disclosed.242 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 In the mediation of family matters, mediators may be presented 
with previously unmentioned allegations and revelations of child 
abuse, or may learn information that leads to a suspicion of child 
abuse. In such situations, mediators are under tremendous pressure 
to address the issue of abuse professionally without causing unneces-
sary harm to everyone the mediation process touches. At the same 
time, mediators must fulfill any legal responsibilities to report sus-
pected child abuse.  
 Mediators’ responsibilities to report suspected abuse vary by 
state. Some states explicitly identify mediators as mandatory report-
ers, others implicitly require mediators to report abuse by requiring 
all persons suspecting abuse to report their suspicions, and others 
split their mediators into ranks of mandatory reporters and permis-
sive reporters by virtue of their professional training and practice in 
fields outside of mediation.243 This difference of opinion as to whether 
mediators should be mandatory reporters begs the question: Should 
mediators be mandatory reporters of abuse? 
 The primary policy goal in family mediation is to improve out-
comes for all parties affected by the mediation, which includes im-
proving outcomes for children. In fact, the importance of mediation 
outcomes as they affect children manifests in legal and ethical direc-
tives requiring mediators to take the best interests of children into 
account when mediating family disputes.244 If mediators have rea-
sonable suspicions of child abuse, it is all but impossible to follow 
those directives without reporting suspected abuse. A mandatory re-
porting requirement for mediators simply closes the loop for taking 
the best interests of children into consideration in family mediation, 
as mediators will not be allowed to permit suspected child abuse to 
continue unabated. Furthermore, since mediators may be the first to 
hear reports of child abuse, mandatory reporting ensures that cases 
that belong in the child protection system get there more quickly, 
which should result in the earlier provision of needed social or thera-
peutic services. Finally, adopting such a requirement also furthers 
the goal of establishing consistency in mediation. The current state of 
varied child abuse reporting requirements will become less accept-
able as consistency and standards become more important in media-
                                                                                                                     
 242. See KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 148-49 (discussing the limits of information 
psychologists are required to report). 
 243. See supra Part III. 
 244. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
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tion’s continued march toward professionalization. For these reasons, 
sound public policy indicates that mediators should be included as 
mandatory reporters under states’ child abuse reporting laws. 
 Many mediators are already mandatory reporters for child 
abuse,245 but those who are not frequently express trepidation at the 
responsibility of being mandatory reporters, particularly when it 
comes to knowing when to make a report of abuse.246 With the re-
quirement to be mandatory reporters comes the need for professional 
education to ensure that mediators understand their reporting re-
sponsibilities.247 Training programs should spend significant 
amounts of time explaining the reporting standard, using clear 
and practical examples.248  
 Besides educating mediators about the standards, training pro-
grams need to make sure mediators are familiar with both the statu-
tory definition of “abuse” and typical indicia of abuse that may be re-
vealed in mediation.249 A nonexhaustive list of such examples in-
cludes: committing physical or sexual abuse or expressing desires to 
commit future physical or sexual abuse; witnessing a spouse engage 
in physically or sexually abusive conduct; denying nutrition or life-
sustaining care and medical treatment; leaving physical injuries, ill-
nesses, or impairments untreated; displaying an apparent indiffer-
ence to a child’s severe psychological or developmental problems; and 
exhibiting parental disabilities (for example, mental illness or drug 
or alcohol addiction) severe enough to make child abuse likely.250 
 Furthermore, training programs should prepare mediators to ad-
dress issues of abuse with the parties during the mediation, such as 
informing participants when a report is legally required, and how to 
                                                                                                                     
 245. See supra Part IV. 
 246. This was the primary reaction from a family mediation practitioners group to 
whom this author presented an earlier version of this Article. Such concerns are typical of 
those who are not familiar with the mandatory reporting system. See, e.g., Donohue et al., 
supra note 211, at 685; Anne Reiniger et al., Mandated Training of Professionals: A Means 
for Improving Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 63, 68 (1995). 
 247. See Besharov, supra note 177, at 143.  
 248. Id. at 144; BESHAROV, supra note 117, at 9.  
 Rather than taking the time to discuss the standard in detail, some professional educa-
tion programs simply tell mandatory reporters to report any child for whom they have the 
slightest concern. Besharov, supra note 162, at 27. This is poor advice, as it gives media-
tors permission to report parents based solely on irrational concerns and worries. See 
BESHAROV, supra note 117, at 9. Naturally such spurious reports lead to problems associ-
ated with overreporting, including harm to children and families who are erroneously iden-
tified to authorities as abusers. See supra note 174. Such advice should not be surprising, 
because reporters often face no liability for an erroneous report made in good faith, but 
careful decisions not to report may result in criminal penalties, civil liability, or professional 
sanction. Besharov, supra note 177, at 145; Steven J. Singley, Comment, Failure to Report 
Suspected Child Abuse: Civil Liability of Mandated Reporters, 19 J. JUV. L. 236, 247 (1998). 
 249. BESHAROV, supra note 117, at 9. 
 250. Besharov, supra note 114, at 197. 
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effectively terminate a mediation session due to child abuse con-
cerns.251 Other important areas for education include the mechanics 
of making a report; the legal protections for reporters; the penalties 
for failing to report; and the interrelated responsibilities of CPS, law 
enforcement, courts, and community service agencies.252 A constant 
theme running through these training programs should be managing 
the tensions mandatory reporting places on mediation’s core values.  
 While adopting mandatory reporting requirements for mediators 
is sound public policy, it is not a panacea for all the difficulties child 
abuse issues cause in mediation. For example, mandatory reporting 
may make mediators unwitting conduits for dubious or fraudulent al-
legations of abuse and could add to the structural problems inherent 
in the child protection system. Experience from current practice, 
however, suggests that these potential problems would be minimal. 
To further control these potential problems and to ensure better re-
porting in general, professional mediation organizations and court of-
ficials should regularly consult with child protection agencies and 
staff. Similar feedback loops have been successful in other manda-
tory reporting contexts253 and should give mediators more confidence 
in the reporting system.254  
 Whether or not states adopt the recommendation of this Article 
and include mediators among the professionals identified as manda-
tory reporters of abuse, family mediators must take the responsibil-
ity to learn more about competently managing child abuse issues in 
mediation.255 In addition to participating in education programs, me-
diators should read the professional literature on the topic, review 
their ethical responsibilities with respect to child abuse issues, and 
discuss child abuse issues with others in the field.256 Only with more 
attention devoted to addressing child abuse issues can the mediation 
community be confident that its practitioners are fully prepared to 
address the sensitive issue of child abuse should it emerge. 
                                                                                                                     
 251. See KALICHMAN, supra note 92, at 145-46 (discussing methods for psychologists to 
inform parents and guardians about the necessity to make a report); TAYLOR, supra note 4, 
at 204-05 (discussing the need to terminate a mediation session once a mediator’s report-
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